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Abstract: We introduce a two-sorted substructural logic called ‘Update Logic’ where the
central objects of study are updates, which are represented formally by ternary relations.
We develop a basic correspondence theory which relates properties of ternary relations
with axioms and inference rules stating properties of updates. We claim that update logic
can capture various logic-based formalisms dealing with belief change. As case study,
we consider the logical framework of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and we show that
we can embed it within update logic. Also, we identify axioms and inference rules that
completely characterize the DEL product update. Moreover, we introduce Gentzen calculi
which extend Gentzen calculi for modal logic and which axiomatize our update logic
and DEL. Our completeness proof techniques are new compared to the standard proof
techniques used to prove completeness of Gentzen calculi. Our contributions to proof
theory are independent from our contributions to the study of logical dynamics and can
also be read independently.
Key-words: Substructural logics, dynamic epistemic logic, update, Gentzen system.
The results of this report are new. Parts of Sections 2, 3.2 and 5.4 will soon be published in (Aucher,
2013) with some minor changes. Also, a part of the introduction of (Aucher, 2011) is reproduced with
minor changes in the beginning of Section 5.4.2.
∗ Universite´ de Rennes 1 - INRIA, France
Logique de la Mise a` Jour
Re´sume´ : Nous introduisons une logique substructurelle type´e appele´e ‘Logique de la
Mise a` Jour’ ou` les objets d’e´tude sont les mises a` jour, qui sont repre´sente´es formelle-
ment par des relations ternaires. Nous de´veloppons une the´orie e´le´mentaire de la corre-
spondance qui relie les proprie´te´s des relations ternaires avec des axiomes et des re`gles
d’infe´rence qui e´noncent des proprie´te´s des mises a` jour. Nous soutenons que notre
logique de la mise a` jour peut capturer de nombreux formalismes logiques qui ont pour
objet d’e´tude le changement de croyances. Comme cas d’e´tude, nous conside´rons le for-
malisme de la logique e´piste´mique dynamique (DEL) et nous montrons que nous pouvons
l’inte´grer dans la logique de la mise a` jour. Par ailleurs, nous identifions des axiomes
et des re`gles d’infe´rence qui caracte´risent comple´tement le produit de mise a` jour de
DEL. De plus, nous introduisons deux calculs de se´quents qui e´tendent les calculs de
se´quents pour la logique modale et qui axiomatisent notre logique de la mise a` jour et
DEL. Nos techniques de preuve de comple´tude sont nouvelles compare´es aux techniques
de preuve standards utilise´es pour prouver la comple´tude des calculs de se´quents. Nos
contributions a` la the´orie de la preuve sont inde´pendantes de nos contributions a` l’e´tude
du dynamisme logique et peuvent eˆtre lues de manie`re inde´pendantes.
Mots-cle´s : Logiques substructurelles, logique e´piste´mique dynamique, mise a` jour,
calcul des se´quents.
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1 Introduction
In everyday life, the way we update and revise our beliefs plays an important role in our
representation of the surrounding world and therefore also in our decision making pro-
cess. This has lead researchers in artificial intelligence and computer science to develop
logic-based theories that study and formalize belief change and the so-called “common
sense reasoning”. The rationale underlying the development of such theories is that it
would ultimately help us understand our everyday life reasoning and the way we update
our beliefs, and that the resulting work could subsequently lead to the development of
tools that could be used for example by artificial agents in order to act autonomously in
an uncertain and changing world. A number of theories have been proposed to capture
different kinds of updates and the reasoning styles that they induce, using different for-
malisms and under various assumptions: dynamic epistemic logic (van Benthem, 2011a;
van Ditmarsch et al., 2007), default and non-monotonic logics (Makinson, 2005; Gabbay
et al., 1998), belief revision theory (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988), conditional logic (Nute and Cross,
2001), etc. . . However, a generic and general framework encompassing all these theories
is still lacking. Instead, the current state of the art is such that we are left with various
formalisms which are difficult to relate formally to each other despite numerous attempts
(Ga¨rdenfors, 1991; Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors, 1989; Aucher, 2010; van Ditmarsch et al.,
2004; Aucher, 2004; Baltag and Smets, 2008b), partly because they rely on different
kinds of formalisms. Our goal in this report is to propose a logical framework based on
the very general framework of substructural logics, where updates are the central objects
of study, and that is abstract enough to be able to embed the existing dynamic theories
of belief change.
Our proposal will be based on the key observation that an update can be represented
abstractly as a ternary relation: the first argument of the ternary relation represents the
initial situation/state, the second the event that occurs in this initial situation (the in-
formative input) and the third the resulting situation/state after the occurrence of the
event. On the basis of this observation, we will then define a logic called update logic.
Update logic is a substructural logic: the semantics of substructural logics also relies
on a ternary relation introduced by Routley and Meyer (1972a; 1972b; 1973; 1982) for
relevance logic in the 1970’s. In substructural logics, the introduction of this relation
was originally motivated by technical reasons (any two-ary connective can be given a
semantics in terms of a ternary relation), and providing a non-circular and conceptually
grounded interpretation of this relation remains problematic (Beall et al., 2012). As
we shall see, our dynamic interpretation of ternary relations as updates provides a con-
ceptual foundation for the Routley and Meyer’s semantics which is also consistent with
some of the interpretations of this ternary relation proposed in the literature.
As case study, we will consider throughout this report the logical framework of Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that we will embed within our update logic. We leave
the embedding of the other logic-based theories of belief change within update logic for
future work. DEL is an influential logical framework for reasoning about the dynamics
of beliefs and knowledge which has drawn the attention of a number of researchers ever
Inria
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since the seminal publication of (Batlag et al., 1998). In fact, DEL has sometimes been
called “update logic”. A number of contributions have linked DEL to older and more
established logical frameworks: it has been embedded into (automata) PDL (van Eijck,
2004; van Benthem and Kooi, 2004), it has been given an algebraic semantics (Baltag
et al., 2005, 2007), and it has been related to epistemic temporal logic (van Benthem
et al., 2009a; Aucher and Herzig, 2011) and the situation calculus (van Benthem, 2011b;
van Ditmarsch et al., 2009). Despite these connections, DEL remains, arguably, a rather
isolated logic in the vast realm of non-classical logics and modal logics. This is problem-
atic if logic is to be viewed ultimately as a unified and unifying field and if we want to
avoid that DEL goes on “riding off madly in all directions” (a metaphor used by van Ben-
them (2011a) about logic in general). We will show that DEL can be embedded within
our update logic. This entails that DEL is a substructural logic. In particular, we will
show that the operators of progression, regression and epistemic planning introduced in
(Aucher, 2011, 2012) correspond formally to standard operators of substructural logics
(like the Lambek Calculus). To demonstrate the generic character of our update logic,
we will sketch a correspondence theory and we will provide axioms and inference rules
that completely characterize the DEL product update.
From a technical point of view, our main contribution in this report is to develop a
basic correspondence theory for update logic and to propose a new method for proving
completeness of Gentzen calculi. This new method relies on an adaptation of the classical
Henkin construction that builds models. As a result of this new approach, we obtain
Gentzen calculi for update logic and its DEL extension which are mere extensions of the
standard Gentzen calculi for propositional and modal logic.
The report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the core of DEL viewed from
a semantic perspective. In Section 3, we briefly recall elementary notions of relevance
and substructural logics and we observe that the ternary relation of relevance logic
(Restall, 2000, 2006; Dunn and Restall, 2002) can be interpreted intuitively as a kind
of update. Then, we proceed further to define our update logic based on this idea. In
Section 4, we provide a sound and complete Gentzen sequent calculus for our update
logic. The method for proving completeness of Gentzen calculi is new and an explanation
of the main new ideas is given for the case of modal (and propositional) logic in Section
4.1, which can be read independently from the rest of the report. In Section 5, we
consider the DEL product update as case study, and we provide axiom schemata and
inference rules based on (Aucher, 2011, 2012) which characterize completely the DEL
product update. Also, we provide a Gentzen calculus for DEL. Finally, we show how the
different operators of (Aucher, 2011, 2012) correspond formally to standard operators of
substructural logics like the Lambek Calculus. We conclude in Section 6.
Note. The results of this report are new. Parts of Sections 2, 3.2 and 5.4 will soon be
published in (Aucher, 2013) with some minor changes. Also, a part of the introduction
of (Aucher, 2011) is reproduced with minor changes in the beginning of Section 5.4.2.
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2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a relatively recent non-classical logic (Batlag et al.,
1998) which extends ordinary modal epistemic logic (Hintikka, 1962) by the inclusion of
event models (called Lα-models in this report) to describe actions, and a product update
operator that defines how epistemic models are updated as the consequence of executing
actions described through event models (see (Baltag and Moss, 2004; van Ditmarsch
et al., 2007; van Benthem, 2011a) for more details). So, the methodology of DEL is such
that it splits the task of representing the agents’ beliefs and knowledge into three parts:
first, one represents their beliefs about an initial situation; second, one represents their
beliefs about an event taking place in this situation; third, one represents the way the
agents update their beliefs about the situation after (or during) the occurrence of the
event. Following this methodology, we also split the exposition of the DEL framework
into three sections.
2.1 Representation of the Initial Situation: L-model
In the rest of this report, ATM is a countable set of propositional letters called atomic
facts which describe static situations, and AGT := {1, . . . ,m} is a finite set of agents.
Definition 1 (Language L and L–structure). We define the language L inductively as
follows:
L : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | jϕ
where p ranges over ATM and j over AGT . We define ⊥ := p ∧ ¬p for a chosen
p ∈ ATM and we also define > := ¬⊥. The formula ♦jϕ is an abbreviation for ¬j¬ϕ,
the formula ϕ → ψ is an abbreviation for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and the formula ϕ ↔ ψ is an
abbreviation for (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
A L-structure is defined inductively as follows, with ϕ ranging over L:
S : X ::= ϕ | X,X
We abusively write ϕ ∈ X when the formula ϕ ∈ L is a substructure of X. 
A (pointed) L–model (M, w) represents how the actual world represented by w is
perceived by the agents. Atomic facts are used to state properties of this actual world.
Definition 2 (L-model). A L-model is a tuple M = (W,R1, . . . , Rm, I) where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
• Rj ⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation on W , for each j ∈ AGT ,
• I : W → 2ATM is a function assigning to each possible world a subset of ATM .
The function I is called an interpretation.
Inria
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A L-frame is a L-model without interpretation. We write w ∈ M for w ∈ W , and
(M, w) is called a pointed L-model (w often represents the actual world). We denote by
C the set of pointed L-models and by CF the class of pointed L-frames. If w, v ∈W , we
write wRjv or (M, w)Rj(M, v) for (w, v) ∈ Rj , and Rj(w) denotes {v ∈W | wRjv}. 
Intuitively, wRjv means that in world w agent j considers that world v might corre-
spond to the actual world. Then, we define the following epistemic language that can be
used to describe and state properties of L-models as follows. The formula jϕ reads as
“agent j believes ϕ”. Its truth conditions are defined in such a way that agent j believes
ϕ holds in a possible world when ϕ holds in all the worlds agent j considers possible.
Definition 3 (Truth conditions of L). Let M be a L-model, w ∈ M and ϕ ∈ L.
M, w ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
M, w p iff p ∈ I(w)
M, w ¬ψ iff not M, w ϕ
M, w ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w ϕ and M, w ψ
M, w ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w ϕ or M, w ψ
M, w jϕ iff for all v ∈ Rj(w),M, v ϕ 
We extend the scope of the relation to also relate pointed L-models to structures:
M, w X, Y iff M, w X and M, w Y
Let C be a class of pointed L–models, let X,Y be L-structures. We say that X entails
Y in the class C, which we write X
C
Y , when the following holds:
X
C
Y iff for all pointed L-model (M, w) ∈ C, if for all ϕ ∈ X M, w ϕ,
then there is ψ ∈ Y such that M, w ψ.
We also write X Y for X C Y , where C is the class of all pointed L–models.
Example 1. Assume that agents A, B and C play a card game with three cards: a
white one, a red one and a blue one. Each of them has a single card but they do not
know the cards of the other players. At each step of the game, some of the players
show their/her/his card to another player or to both other players, either privately or
publicly. We want to study and represent the dynamics of the agents’ beliefs in this
game. The initial situation is represented by the pointed L-model (M, w) of Figure 1.
In this example, AGT := {A,B,C} and ATM := {rj , bj , wj | j ∈ AGT} where rj stands
for ‘agent j has the red card’, bj stands for ‘agent j has the blue card’ and wj stands
for ‘agent j has the white card’. The boxed possible world corresponds to the actual
world. The propositional letters not mentioned in the possible worlds do not hold in
these possible worlds. The accessibility relations are represented by arrows indexed by
agents between possible worlds. Reflexive arrows are omitted in the figure, which means
that for all worlds v ∈M and all agents j ∈ AGT , v ∈ Rj(v). In this model, we have for
example the following statement: M, w (wB ∧ ¬AwB) ∧ C¬AwB. It states that
player A does not ‘know’ that player B has the white card and player C ‘knows’ it. 
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Figure 1: Cards Example
2.2 Representation of the Event: Lα-model
The language Lα was introduced by Baltag et al. (1999). The propositional letters pψ
describing events are called atomic events and range over ATMα = {pψ : ψ ranges over
L}. The reading of pψ is “an event of precondition ψ is occurring”.
Definition 4 (Language Lα and Lα–structure). We define the language Lα inductively
as follows:
Lα : α ::= pψ | ¬α | α ∧ α | α ∨ α | jα
where ψ ranges over L and j over AGT . We define ⊥ := pψ ∧¬pψ for a chosen ψ ∈ L
and we define > := ¬⊥. The formula ♦jα is an abbreviation for ¬j¬α, the formula
α → β is an abbreviation for ¬α ∨ β, and the formula α ↔ β is an abbreviation for
(α→ β) ∧ (β → α).
A Lα-structure is defined inductively as follows, with β ranging over Lα:
Sα : Xα ::= β | Xα, Xα
We abusively write α ∈ Xα when the formula α ∈ Lα is a substructure of Xα. 
A pointed Lα-model (E , e) represents how the actual event represented by e is per-
ceived by the agents. Intuitively, f ∈ Rαj (e) means that while the possible event repre-
sented by e is occurring, agent j considers possible that the possible event represented
by f is actually occurring.
Definition 5 (Lα–model, Batlag et al. 1998). A Lα-model is a tuple E =
(Wα, Rα1 , . . . , R
α
m, I
α) where:
• Wα is a non-empty set of possible events,
• Rαj ⊆Wα ×Wα is an accessibility relation on Wα, for each j ∈ AGT ,
Inria
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e : rA
C
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Figure 2: Players A and B show their cards to each other in front of player C
• Iα : Wα → L is a function assigning to each possible event a formula of L. The
function Iα is called the precondition function.
Let P be a subset of L. A P–complete Lα–model is a Lα–model which satisfies moreover
the following condition:
• Iα(e) ∈ P , for each e ∈Wα (P-complete)
A Lα–frame is a Lα–model without precondition function Iα. We abusively write
e ∈ E for e ∈Wα, and (E , e) is called a pointed Lα-model (e often represents the actual
event). We denote by Cα the set of pointed Lα-models, by CαP the set of pointed P -
complete event models and by CFα the class of pointed Lα-frames. If e, f ∈Wα, we write
eRαj f or (E , e)Rαj (E , f) for (e, f) ∈ Rαj , and Rαj (e) denotes {f ∈Wα | eRαj f}. 
The truth conditions of the language Lα are identical to the truth conditions of the
language L:
Definition 6 (Truth conditions of Lα). Let E be a Lα-model, e ∈ E and α ∈ Lα.
E , e α is defined inductively as follows:
E , e pψ iff Iα(e) = ψ
E , e ¬α iff not E , e α
E , e α ∧ β iff E , e α and E , e β
E , e α ∨ β iff E , e α or E , e β
E , e jα iff for all f ∈ Rαj (e), E , f α
Let C be a class of pointed Lα–models, let Xα, Y α be Lα–structures. We say that
X entails Y in the class C, which we write Xα
C
Y α, when the following holds:
Xα
C
Y α iff for all pointed Lα-model (E , e) ∈ C,
if for all α ∈ Xα E , e α, then there is β ∈ Y α such that E , e β.
We also write Xα Y α for Xα Cα Y
α, where Cα is the class of all pointed Lα–
models. 
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e : rA
A,B,C

Figure 3: Public announcement of rA
Example 2. Let us resume Example 1 and assume that players A and B show their
card to each other. As it turns out, C noticed that A showed her card to B but did not
notice that B did so to A. Players A and B know this. This event is represented in the
Lα-model (E , e) of Figure 2. The boxed possible event e corresponds to the actual event
‘player A shows her red card’ (with precondition rA), f stands for the event ‘player A
shows her white card’ (with precondition wA) and g stands for the atomic event ‘players
A and B show their red and white cards respectively to each other’ (with precondition
rA ∧ wA).
E , e prA ∧ (♦AprA ∧AprA) ∧ (♦BprA ∧BprA)
∧ (♦CpwA ∧ ♦CprA∧wA ∧C (pwA ∨ prA∧wA)) (1)
It states that players A and B show their cards to each other, players A and B ‘know’
this and consider it possible, while player C considers possible that player A shows her
white card and also considers possible that player A shows her red card, since he does
not know her card. In fact, that is all that player C considers possible since he believes
that either player A shows her red card or her white card.
The Lα-model of Figure 3 corresponds to a ‘public announcement’ or ‘public display’
of the fact that agent A has the red card. In particular, the following statement holds
in the example of Figure 3:
E , e prA ∧AprA ∧BprA ∧CprA
∧AAprA ∧ABprA ∧ACprA
∧BAprA ∧BBprA ∧BCprA
∧CAprA ∧CBprA ∧CCprA
∧ . . .
It states that player A shows her red card and that players A, B and C ‘know’ it,
that players A, B and C ‘know’ that each of them ‘know’ it, etc. . . in other words, there
is common knowledge among players A, B and C that player A shows her red card.1
E , e prA ∧∗AGT prA .

1We write E , e ∗AGTα when for all f ∈
( ⋃
j∈AGT
Rαj
)∗
(e), E , f α. See for example (Fagin et al.,
1995) for a detailed study of the operator ∗AGT of common knowledge
Inria
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Figure 4: Situation after the Update of the Situation Represented in Figure 1 by the
Event Represented in Figure 2
2.3 Update of the Initial Situation by the Event: Product Update
The DEL product update of (Batlag et al., 1998) is defined as follows. This update
yields a new L-model (M, w) ⊗ (E , e) representing how the new situation which was
previously represented by (M, w) is perceived by the agents after the occurrence of the
event represented by (E , e).
Definition 7 (Product update). Let (M, w) = (W,R1, . . . , Rm, I, w) be a pointed
L-model and let (E , e) = (Wα, Rα1 , . . . , Rαm, I, e) be a pointed Lα-model such that
M, w Iα(e). The product update of (M, w) and (E , e) is the pointed L-model
(M⊗E , (w, e)) = (W⊗, R⊗1 , . . . , R⊗m, I⊗, (w, e)) defined as follows: for all v ∈W and all
f ∈Wα,
• W⊗ = {(v, f) ∈W ×Wα | M, v Iα(f)},
• R⊗j (v, f) = {(u, g) ∈W⊗ | u ∈ Rj(v) and g ∈ Rαj (f)},
• I⊗(v, f) = I(v). 
Example 3. As a result of the event described in Example 2, the agents update their
beliefs. We get the situation represented in the L-model (M, w)⊗ (E , e) of Figure 4. In
this model, we have for example the following statement:
(M, w)⊗ (E , e) (wB ∧BAwB) ∧BC¬BAwB.
It states that player A ‘knows’ that player B has the white card but player C believes
that it is not the case. 
3 Substructural Logics and Update Logic
Substructural logics are a family of logics lacking some of the structural rules of classical
logic. A structural Rule is a Rule of inference which is closed under substitution of for-
mulas. The structural rules for classical logic are given in Figure 5. While (Weakening)
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Weakening: Associativity:
X Y
ϕ,X Y
WL
X Y
X Y,ϕ
WR
X, (Y, Z) U
(X,Y ), Z U
B
Contraction: Commutativity:
ϕ,ϕ,X Y
ϕ,X Y
CL
X Y,ϕ, ϕ
X Y,ϕ
CR
Y,X Z
X, Y Z
PL
Figure 5: Structural Rules
and (Contraction) are often dropped like in relevance logic and linear logic, the Rule of
(Associativity) is often preserved. We shall see in this report that DEL invalidates all
of them.
3.1 Substructural Logics
Our exposition of substructural logics is based on (Restall, 2000, 2006; Dunn and Re-
stall, 2002). The logical framework presented in (Restall, 2000) is much more general
and studies a wide range of substructural logics: relevance logic, linear logic, lambek
calculus, display logic, etc. . . For what concerns us in this report, we will only introduce
a fragment of this general framework. The semantics of substructural logics is based on
the ternary relation of the frame semantics for relevant logic originally introduced by
Routley and Meyer (1972a; 1972b; 1973; 1982). Another semantics proposed indepen-
dently by Urquhart (1971; 1972a; 1972b) at about the same time will be discussed at
the end of this section.
Definition 8 (Language LSub and LSub–structure). The language LSub is defined induc-
tively as follows:
LSub : ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ |
ϕ ⊃ ϕ | ϕ ⊂ ϕ | ϕ ◦ ϕ
where p ranges over ATM .
A LSub–structure is defined inductively as follows, with ϕ ranging over LSub:
X ::= ϕ | (X,X) | (X;X) 
Definition 9 (Point set, plump accessibility relation). A point set P = (P,v) is a set
P together with a partial order v on P . The set Prop(P) of propositions on P is the
set of all subsets X of P which are closed upwards: that is, if x ∈ X and x v x′ then
x′ ∈ X. When v is the identity relation, we say that P is flat. We abusively write x ∈ P
for x ∈ P .
Inria
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• A binary relation T is a positive two–place accessibility relation on the point set
P iff for any x, y ∈ P where xT y, if x′ v x then there is a y′ w y, where x′T y′.
Similarly, if xT y and y v y′ then there is some x′ v x, where x′T y′.
• A ternary relation R is a three–place accessibility relation iff whenever Rxyz and
z v z′ then there are y′ w y and x′ v x, where Rx′y′z′. Similarly, if x′ v x then
there are y′ v y and z′ w z, where Rx′y′z′, and if y′ v y then there are x′ v x and
z′ w z, where Rx′y′z′.
• A ternary relation R is a plump accessibility relation on the point set P if and only
if for any x, y, z, x′, y′, z′ ∈ P such that Rxyz, if x′ v x, y′ v y and z v z′, then
Rx′y′z′. 
Note that the conditions satisfied by v in the definition of a three–place ternary
relation correspond to the definition of a directed bisimulation for categorial logic (van
Benthem, 1996, Def. 12.11) (originally introduced by Kurtonina (1995)). The correspon-
dence is not surprising since a directed bisimulation preserves the truth of the formulas
of categorial logic and of the ternary modal semantics (van Benthem, 2010, Chap. 10).
Our definition of LSub–model corresponds to the definition of a model in (Restall,
2000, Chap. 11) stripped out from all its truth sets. These other features are not needed
for what concerns us here.
Definition 10 (LSub–model). A LSub–model is a tuple MR = (P, T ,R, I) where:
• P = (P,v) is a point set;
• T ⊆ P × P is a positive two–place accessibility relation on P;
• R ⊆ P × P × P is a three–place accessibility relation on P;
• I : P → 2ATM is an interpretation function.
We abusively write x ∈MR for x ∈ P, and (MR, x) is called a pointed LSub–model. 
Note that in the above definition, there could be multiple positive two–place acces-
sibility relations T1, . . . , Tn corresponding to multiple modalities 1, . . .n. We refrain
from defining LSub–models in their full generality in order to ease the readability of the
report.
Definition 11 (Truth conditions of LSub). Let MR be a LSub–model, x ∈ MR and
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ϕ ∈ LSub. The relation MR, x ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
MR, x > always
MR, x ⊥ never
MR, x p iff p ∈ I(x)
MR, x ¬ϕ iff not MR, x ϕ
MR, x ϕ ∧ ψ iff MR, x ϕ and MR, x ψ
MR, x ϕ ∨ ψ iff MR, x ϕ or MR, x ψ
MR, x ϕ iff for all y ∈MR, where xT y,MR, y ϕ
MR, x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff for all y, z ∈ P where Rxyz, if MR, y ϕ then MR, z ψ
MR, x ψ ⊂ ϕ iff for all y, z ∈ P where Ryxz if MR, y ϕ then MR, z ψ
MR, x ϕ ◦ ψ iff there are y, z ∈ P such that Ryzx,MR, y ϕ and MR, z ψ
We extend the scope of the relation to also relate points to LSub–structures:
MR, x X, Y iff MR, x X and MR, x Y
MR, x X;Y iff there are y, z ∈MR such that Ryzx,MR, y X and MR, z Y
We say that MR validates a LSub–structure X when for all x ∈ MR, MR, x X.
Let X be a structure and let ϕ ∈ LSub. We say that X entails ϕ, written X ϕ, when
the following holds:
X ϕ iff for all pointed LSub–model (MR, x), if MR, x X, then MR, x ϕ. 
We list below some key inferences of substructural logics, more precisely of the Lam-
bek Calculus:
ϕ;ψ χ iff ϕ ψ ⊃ χ (2)
ϕ ψ ⊃ χ iff ϕ ◦ ψ χ (3)
ϕ ◦ ψ χ iff ψ χ ⊂ ϕ (4)
ϕ ψ ⊃ χ iff ψ χ ⊂ ϕ (5)
Urquhart’s semantics. The Urquhart’s semantics for relevance logic was developed
independently from the Routley–Meyer’s semantics in the early 1970’s. An operational
frame is a set of points P together with a function which gives us a new point from a
pair of points:
unionsq : P × P → P. (6)
An operational model is then an operational frame together with a relation which
indicates what formulas are true at what points. The truth conditions for the implication
⊃ are defined as follows:
x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff for each y, if y ϕ then x unionsq y ψ (7)
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As one can easily notice, an operational frame is a Routley-Meyer frame where Rxyz
holds if and only if x unionsq y = z. Hence, the ternary relation R of the Routley–Meyer
semantics is a generalization of the function unionsq of the Urquhart’s semantics. Because it
is a relation, it allows moreover to apply x to y and yield either a set of outcomes or no
outcome at all.
3.2 Updates as Ternary Relations
The ternary relation R of the Routley and Meyer semantics was introduced originally
for technical reasons: any 2-ary (n-ary) connective of a logical language can be given a
semantics by resorting to a 3-ary (resp. n + 1-ary) relation on worlds. Subsequently, a
number of philosophical interpretations of this ternary relation have been proposed and
we will briefly recall some of them at the end of this section (see (Beall et al., 2012;
Restall, 2006; Mares and Meyer, 2001) for more details). However, one has to admit
that providing a non-circular and conceptually grounded interpretation of this relation
remains problematic. In this report, we propose a new dynamic interpretation of this
relation, inspired by the ternary semantics of DEL.
First, one should observe that the DEL product update ⊗ of Definition 7 can be
seen as a partial function F from a pair of pointed L–model and pointed Lα–model to
another pointed L–model:
F : C × Cα → C (8)
There is a formal similarity between this abstract definition of the DEL product
update and the function unionsq of Expression (6) introduced by Urquhart in the early 1970s
for providing a semantics to the implication of relevance logic. This similarity is not only
formal but also intuitively meaningful. Indeed, the intuitive interpretation of the DEL
product update operator is very similar to the intuitive interpretation of the function unionsq
of Urquhart. Points are sometimes also called “worlds”, “states”, “situation”, “set-ups”,
and as explained by Restall:
“We have a class of points (over which x and y vary), and a function unionsq which
gives us new points from old. The point x unionsq y is supposed, on Urquhart’s
interpretation, to be the body of information given by combining x with y.”
(Restall, 2006, p. 363)
and also, keeping in mind the truth conditions for the connective ⊃ of Expression (7):
“To be committed to A ⊃ B is to be committed to B whenever we gain the
information that A. To put it another way, a body of information warrants
A ⊃ B if and only if whenever you update that information with new infor-
mation which warrants A, the resulting (perhaps new) body of information
warrants B.” (my emphasis) (Restall, 2006, p. 362)
From these two quotes, it is natural to interpret the DEL product update ⊗ of
Definition 7 as a specific kind of Urquhart’s function unionsq (Expression (6)). Moreover,
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as explained by Restall, this substructural “update” can be nonmonotonic and may
correspond to some sort of revision:
“[C]ombination is sometimes nonmonotonic in a natural sense. Sometimes
when a body of information is combined with another body of information,
some of the original body of information might be lost. This is simplest to
see in the case motivating the failure of A B ⊃ A. A body of information
might tell us that A. However, when we combine it with something which
tells us B, the resulting body of information might no longer warrant A (as
A might with B). Combination might not simply result in the addition of
information. It may well warrant its revision.” (my emphasis) (Restall, 2006,
p. 363)
Our dynamic interpretation of the ternary relation is consistent with the above con-
siderations: sometimes, updating beliefs amounts to revise beliefs. As it turns out,
belief revision has also been extensively studied within the DEL framework and DEL
has been extended to deal with this phenomenon (Aucher, 2004; van Ditmarsch, 2005;
van Benthem, 2007a; Baltag and Smets, 2008c,b; Liu, 2008; Aucher, 2008).
More generally, an update can be seen as a partial function F from a pair of pointed
L–model and pointed Lα–model to a set of pointed L–model:
F : C × Cα → P(C) (9)
Equivalently, an update can be seen as a ternary relationR defined on C∪Cα between
three pointed models ((M, w), (E , e), (Mf , wf )) where (M, w) is a pointed L–model,
(E , e) is a pointed Lα–model and (Mf , wf ) is another pointed L–model:
R ⊆ C × Cα × C (10)
The ternary relation of Expression (10) then resembles the ternary relation of the
Routley and Meyer semantics. This is not surprising since the Routley and Meyer
semantics generalizes the Urquhart semantics (they are essentially the same, since as we
explained it in the previous section, an operational frame is a Routley and Meyer frame
where Rxyz holds if and only if x unionsq y = z). Viewed from the perspective of DEL, the
ternary relation then represents a particular sort of update. With this interpretation in
mind, Rxyz reads as ‘the occurrence of event y in world x results in the world z’ and
the corresponding conditional α ⊃ ϕ reads as ‘the occurrence in the current world of an
event satisfying property α results in a world satisfying ϕ’.
The dynamic reading of the ternary relation and its corresponding conditional is very
much in line with the so-called “Ramsey Test” of conditional logic. The Ramsey test can
be viewed as the very first modern contribution to the logical study of conditionals and
much of the contemporary work on conditional logic can be traced back to the famous
footnote of Ramsey (1929). Roughly, it consists in defining a counterfactual conditional
in terms of belief revision: an agent currently believes that ϕ would be true if ψ were
true (i.e. ψ ⊃ ϕ) if and only if he should believe ϕ after learning ψ. A first attempt
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to provide truth conditions for conditionals, based on Ramsey’s ideas, was proposed by
Stalnaker. He defined his semantics by means of selection functions over possible worlds
f : W × 2W → W . As one can easily notice, Stalnaker’s selection functions could also
be considered from a formal point of view as a special kind of ternary relation, since a
relation Rf ⊆ W × 2W ×W can be canonically associated to each selection function
f . Moreover, like the ternary relation corresponding to a product update (Expression
(10)), this ternary relation is ‘two-sorted’: the antecedent of a conditional takes value
in a set of worlds (instead of a single world).2 So, the dynamic reading of the ternary
semantics is consistent with the dynamic reading of conditionals proposed by Ramsey.
This dynamic reading was not really considered and investigated by substructural
logicians when they connected the substructural ternary semantics with conditional logic
(Beall et al., 2012). On the other hand, the dynamic reading of inferences has been
stressed to a large extent by van Benthem (2007b; 2011a) (we will come back to this point
in Section 5.4), and also by Baltag and Smets (2006, 2008c,b) who distinguished dynamic
belief revision from static (standard) belief revision. What distinguishes dynamic belief
revision from static belief revision is that the latter is a revision of the agent’s beliefs
about the state of the world as it was before an event, and the former is a revision of the
state of the world as it is after the event. Note, however, that this important distinction
between static belief revision and dynamic belief revision collapses in the case of relevant
logic, because in that case we only deal with propositional formulas. This shows again
that a dynamic interpretation of the ternary semantics of substructural logic is consistent
with the interpretations proposed by substructural logicians. In fact, our point of view is
also very much in line with the claim of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (1991; 1989) that non-
monotonic reasoning and belief revision are “two sides of the same coin”: as a matter of
fact, non-monotonic reasoning is a reasoning style and belief revision is a sort of update.
Likewise, the formal connection in this case also relies on a similar idea based on the
Ramsey test.
To summarize our discussion, the DEL product update provides substructural logics
with an intuitive and consistent interpretation of its ternary relation. This interpreta-
tion is consistent in the sense that the intuitions underlying the definitions of the DEL
framework are coherent with those underlying the ternary semantics of substructural
logic, as witnessed by our quotes and citations from the substructural literature.
Other interpretations of the ternary relation One interpretation, due to Barwise
(1993) and developed by Restall (1996), takes worlds to be ‘sites’ or ‘channels’, a site
being possibly a channel and a channel being possibly a site. If x, y and z are sites, Rxyz
reads as ‘x is a channel between y and z’. Hence, if ϕ ⊃ ψ is true at channel x, it means
that all sites y and z connected by channel x are such that if ϕ is information available
in y, then ψ is information available in z. Another similar interpretation due to Mares
(1996) adapts Israel and Perry’s theory of information (Perry and Israel, 1990) to the
relational semantics. In this interpretation, worlds are situations in the sense of Barwise
2Note that Burgess (1981) already proposed a ternary semantics for conditionals, but his truth con-
ditions and his interpretation of the ternary relation were quite different from ours.
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and Perry’s situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983) and pieces of information
– called infons – can carry information about other infons: an infon might carry the
information that a red light on a mobile phone carries the information that the battery
of the mobile phone is low. In this interpretation, the ternary relation R represents the
informational links in situations: if there is an informational link in situation x that says
that an infon σ carries the information that the infon pi also holds, then if Rxyz holds
and y contains the infon σ, then z contains the infon pi. Other interpretations of the
ternary relation have been proposed by Beall et al. (2012), with a particular focus on
their relation to conditionality.
3.3 Update logic
We define our logical language, whose semantics will be based on the idea to view
an update as a ternary relation of a susbtructural frame. This idea is motivated and
intuitively grounded in the analysis of the previous section.
Our language extends both the language L and the language Lα of Section 2. Like
our semantics, it is two-sorted: it contains both formulas of L and formulas of Lα.
Definition 12 (Language LR). The language LR is two-sorted and is defined by a
double induction as follows:
LϕR : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | jϕ | α ⊃ ϕ | ϕ ◦ α
LαR : α ::= pψ | ¬α | α ∧ α | α ∨ α | jα | ϕ ⊂ ϕ
where p ranges over ATM , ψ ranges over LϕR and j over AGT . 
Definition 13 (LR–structure and LR–sequent). The LR–structures are defined induc-
tively as follows:
Sϕ : X ::= ϕ | X,X | (X;Xα)
Sϕ′ : X ::= ϕ | X,X
where ϕ ranges over LR and α ranges over Lα. The expression Γ(X) denotes a
LR–structure containing as substructure the LR–structure X, and Γ(Z) denotes the
LR–structure Γ(X) where X is uniformly substituted by the structure Z.
A LR–sequent is a Lα–sequent or an expression of the form X Y or X , where
X ∈ Sϕ, Y ∈ Sϕ′ . 
Definition 14 (Update model). An update model is a LSub–model MR =
(P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R, I) where:
• P = (P,=) is a flat point set such that P ⊆ C ∪ Cα.
• Rj ⊆ P × P is a positive two-place accessibility relation on P for each j ∈ AGT
such that for all x, y ∈ P, where x = (Mx, wx) and y = (My, wy):
x ∈ Rj(y) iff Mx =My and wx ∈ Rj(wy)
Inria
Update Logic 19
• R ⊆ P × P × P is a ternary relation on P such that R ⊆ C × Cα × C;
• I : P → 2ATM∪ATMα is an interpretation such that for all x = (W,R1, . . . , Rm, I) ∈
C, I(x) = I(x) ∈ 2ATM , and for all x = (Wα, Rα1 , . . . , Rαm, Iα) ∈ Cα, I(x) =
Iα(x) ∈ 2ATMα is a singleton.
The class of update models is denoted CR. An update frame is an update model without
interpretation function. 
Note that the accessibility relations Rj of L-models and Lα-models are seen in this
definition as positive two-place accessibility relations Rj . The truth conditions are the
same as the ones for LR-models:
Definition 15 (Truth conditions of LR). Let MR be an update model, x ∈ MR and
ϕ ∈ LR. The relation MR, x ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
MR, x p iff p ∈ I(x)
MR, x ¬ϕ iff not MR, x ϕ
MR, x ϕ ∧ ψ iff MR, x ϕ and MR, x ψ
MR, x ϕ ∨ ψ iff MR, x ϕ or MR, x ψ
MR, x jϕ iff for all y ∈ P such that xRjy,MR, y ϕ
MR, x α ⊃ ψ iff for all y, z ∈ P such that Rxyz, if MR, y α then MR, z ψ
MR, x ψ ⊂ ϕ iff for all y, z ∈ P such that Ryxz, if MR, y ϕ then MR, z ψ
MR, x ϕ ◦ α iff there are y, z ∈ P such that Ryzx,MR, y ϕ and MR, z α
We extend the scope of the relation to also relate points to LR–structures:
MR, x X, Y iff MR, x X and MR, x Y
MR, x X;Y iff there are y, z ∈MR such that Ryzx,MR, y X and MR, z Y
Let C be a class of update models, and let X ϕ be a LR–sequent. We say that X
entails ϕ in the class C, written X C ϕ, when the following holds:
X C ϕ iff for all x ∈MR ∈ C, if MR, x X, then MR, x ϕ.
LetMR be an update model. We say thatMR validates a LR-sequent X ϕ when
X {MR} ϕ. We say that MR validates an inference Rule when, if MR validates its
premise(s), then MR validates its conclusion(s). Similar definitions hold by replacing
models with frames. 
Naturally, the truth conditions for coincide with the truth conditions for if
we only consider epistemic formulas:
Proposition 1. Let MR be an update model, ϕ ∈ L and x ∈ MR such that x ∈ C.
Then, MR, x ϕ iff x ϕ. Let α ∈ Lα and let y ∈ MR such that y ∈ Cα. Then,
MR, y ϕ iff y α.
Proof. Straightforward.
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Epistemic Temporal Logic. The frame semantics of substructural logic is very ab-
stract and general and it provides a rich framework which captures a wide range of logics,
such as arrow logic (van Benthem, 1996, Chap. 8), action frames and domain space (see
(Restall, 2000, Example 11.12–11.15) for more details) but also linear logic, relevance
logic, the lambek calculus. . . But the epistemic temporal models of ETL (Parikh and Ra-
manujam, 2003) (which have been related to DEL byvan Benthem et al. (2007, 2009a))
can also be viewed as models of the ternary semantics of substructural logic:
Fact 1. Any epistemic temporal model of ETL can be mapped to an update model.
Proof. We recall the basic definitions of ETL. Let Σ be any set. Elements of Σ are
called events, and elements of the set of finite strings Σ∗ histories. Given h, h′ ∈ Σ∗,
we write h  h′ if h is a prefix of h′. A protocol is a prefix-closed set H ⊆ Σ∗, i.e.
{h ∈ Σ∗ : h is non-empty and there is h′ ∈ H such that h  h′} ⊆ H. An epistemic
temporal model of ETL is a tuple (H, R, V ) where H is a protocol, R : AGT → 2H×H
assigns an accessibility relation R(j) := Rj to each agent j ∈ AGT , and V : ATM → 2H
is a valuation.
An epistemic temporal model M = (H, R, V ) can thus be naturally mapped to an
update model MR = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R, I) as follows:
• P := (P,=) is defined by P := P1 unionsq P2 where P1 := {(M,h) : h ∈ H} and
P2 := {(M,hc) : h ∈ Hc} where Hc is a disjoint copy of H;
• for all j ∈ AGT , for all h, h′ ∈ H, h′ ∈ Rj(h) iff h′ ∈ Rj(h) and for all hc, h′c ∈ Hc,
h
′c ∈ Rj(hc) iff h′ ∈ Rj(h);
• R ⊆ P1 × P2 × P1 is such that (h, h′c, h′′) ∈ R iff h′′ = h′ = he for some e ∈ Σ;
• for all x ∈ P1, I(x) = {p ∈ ATM : x ∈ V (p)}, and for all x ∈ P2, I(x) is an
arbitrary singleton of ATMα.
4 Gentzen Calculi
In this section, we provide a Gentzen calculus for update logic. The completeness proof
for this Gentzen calculus relies on a new method that is not specific to our update logic
but that applies to any Gentzen-like calculus. So, to highlight these new ideas, we first
apply this method to the case of modal logic in Section 4.1. Then, we extend our proof
to prove completeness of our Gentzen calculus for update logic in Section 4.2.
4.1 A New Method to Prove Completeness of Gentzen Calculi
We first define our Gentzen calculus for modal (epistemic) logic.
Definition 16 (Sequent Calculus L). The sequent calculus for L, denoted L, is defined
in Figure 6. A L–sequent X Y is provable in L, written X L Y , when it can be derived
from the axioms and inference rules of L in a finite number of steps. 
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Axiom:
ϕ ϕ
Structural Rules:
Weakening: Contraction: Permutation:
X Y
X,ϕ Y
WL
X,ϕ, ϕ Y
X,ϕ Y
CL
X,ψ, ϕ, Y Z
X,ϕ, ψ, Y Z
PL
X Y
X ϕ, Y
WR
X Y,ϕ, ϕ
X Y,ϕ
CR
X Y,ψ, ϕ, Z
X Y,ϕ, ψ, Z
PR
Cut Rule:
X Y,ϕ ϕ,U V
X,U Y, V
Cut
Logical Rules:
Propositional Rules:
X Y,ϕ
X,¬ϕ Y ¬R
X,ϕ Y
X Y,¬ϕ ¬L
X,ϕ Y
X,ϕ ∧ ψ Y ∧
1
L
X,ψ Y
X,ϕ ∧ ψ Y ∧
2
L
X Y,ϕ U V, ψ
X,U Y, V, ϕ ∧ ψ ∧R
X Y,ϕ
X Y,ϕ ∨ ψ ∨
1
R
X Y,ψ
X Y,ϕ ∨ ψ ∨
2
R
X,ϕ Y U, ψ V
X,U, ϕ ∨ ψ Y, V ∨L
Modal Rule:
X ϕ
jX jϕ
k
where the L–structure jX is defined inductively as follows: jX := jϕ if X = ϕ
and jX := jY,jZ if X = Y,Z.
Figure 6: Sequent Calculus of Modal Logic
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As one can easily notice, our sequent calculus for modal logic of Figure 7 is simply the
classical sequent calculus for modal logic (without resorting to the symbol ⊥) (Leivant,
1981; Sambin and Valentini, 1982), i.e., it is the original sequent calculus LK of Gentzen
(1935) (for propositional formulas and without material implication) together with the
modal Rule k. Gentzen calculi for modal logic are studied in depth in (Poggiolesi, 2010;
Wansing, 2002).
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness). For all L-sequents X Y , it holds that
X L Y iff X Y .
Soundness and Completeness Proof of L w.r.t. L In the rest of this section, we
prove Theorem 2. We use a new method compared to the usual proof method which relies
on a syntactic reduction of provable sequents to theorems of a Hilbert system (Kleene
et al., 1971) by resorting to the Cut Rule. The idea underlying our completeness proof
is to use a Henkin style construction and define a canonical model that will invalidate
the considered L–sequent.
To prove Theorem 2, we first define the notions of L–consistent set over the set
L. First, we introduce some notations. If Y = ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ S, then ¬Y denotes
¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn.
Definition 17 (L–consistent set and maximal L–consistent set of L).
• A L–consistent set Γ of L is a set of formulas of L such that there are no
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ such that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L .
• A maximal L–consistent set Γ of L is a L–consistent set of L such that there is no
ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /∈ Γ and Γ ∪ {ϕ} is L–consistent. 
Fact 2. Let Γ be a maximal L–consistent set of L. Then, for all ϕ ∈ L, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Assume that there is ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ /∈ Γ. Then, Γ ∪ {ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ} is not
L-consistent. So, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ such that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L . However,
L ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ. So, by application of the Cut rule, we have that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L . But because
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ, this entails that Γ is not L–consistent, which is impossible.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be a maximal L–consistent set. For all ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ Γ, all ϕ ∈ L, if
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk L ϕ then ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. First, we show that Γ∪{ϕ} is L–consistent. Assume towards a contradiction that
it is not the case. Then, there are ψ1, . . . , ψl ∈ Γ such that ψ1, . . . , ψl, ϕ L . By WL and
WR, we have that ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ1, . . . , ψl, ϕ L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ1, . . . , ψl L ϕ, because by
assumption ϕ1, . . . , ϕk L ϕ. Therefore, ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ1, . . . , ψl,¬ϕ L by Rule ¬L. So,
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ1, . . . , ψl,¬ϕ ∨ ϕ L by Rule ∨L. Because ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ Γ by Fact 2 (since Γ is
a maximal L–consistent set), and ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ1, . . . , ψl ∈ Γ, we conclude that Γ is not
L–consistent, which is impossible. Thus, our initial assumption was wrong and Γ ∪ {ϕ}
is L–consistent. Then, because Γ is a maximal L–consistent set, we have finally that
ϕ ∈ Γ.
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Then, we have the following Lindenbaum-like lemma:
Lemma 4. Any L–consistent set over L can be extended into a maximal L–consistent
set over L.
Proof. Let Γ be a L–consistent set of L and let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . . be an enumeration of
the formulas of L (it exists because ATM is countable). We define inductively the sets
Γn as follows:
Γ0 := Γ
Γn+1 :=
{
Γn ∪ {ϕn} if Γn ∪ {ϕn} is L–consistent;
Γn otherwise
Then, we define the set Γ+ of L as follows: Γ+ := ⋃
n≥0
Γn.
We show that Γ+ is a maximal L–consistent set of L. Clearly, for all n ∈ N, Γn is L-
consistent by definition of Γn. So, if Γ
+ was not L-consistent, there would be n0 ∈ N such
that Γn0 is not L-consistent, which is impossible. Now, assume towards a contradiction
that Γ+ is not a maximal L-consistent set. Then, there is ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /∈ Γ+ and
Γ+∪{ϕ} is L-consistent. But there is n ∈ N such that ϕ = ϕn. Because ϕ /∈ Γ+, we also
have that ϕn /∈ Γn+1. So, Γn ∪ {ϕn} is not L-consistent by definition of Γ+. Therefore,
Γ+ ∪ {ϕ} is not L-consistent, which is impossible.
Then, we define the canonical update model associated to L.
Definition 18 (Canonical update model). The canonical update model associated to L
is the L-model Mc := (Sc, Rc1, . . . Rcm, Ic) defined as follows:
• Sc is the set C of all maximal L–consistent sets of L;
• for all Γ,Γ′ ∈ C, all j = 1, . . . ,m,
(Γ,Γ′) ∈ Rcj iff for all jϕ ∈ Γ, we have that ϕ ∈ Γ′
• for all p ∈ ATM , p ∈ Ic(Γ) iff p ∈ Γ. 
Lemma 5. It holds that R⊃ = R⊂ = R◦.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 11.25 of (Restall, 2000).
Hence, from now on, we will denote this relation R := R⊃ = R⊂ = R◦.
Lemma 6 (Truth lemma). For all ϕ ∈ L, for all maximal consistent set Γ, we have that
Mc,Γ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ. (11)
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ.
• ϕ := p: this case holds by definition of Mc.
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• ϕ := ¬ψ: assume that ¬ψ ∈ Γ. Assume towards a contradiction that ψ ∈ Γ. By
application of Rule ¬R to the Axiom, we have that ψ,¬ψ L . But ψ,¬ψ ∈ Γ,
so Γ is not L-consistent. This is impossible, so ψ /∈ Γ. Therefore, by induction
hypothesis, it is not the case that Γ ψ. That is, Γ ¬ψ. For the other direction,
if Γ ¬ψ, then it is not the case that Γ ψ. So, by induction hypothesis,
ψ /∈ Γ. If ¬ψ /∈ Γ, then ψ /∈ Γ and ¬ψ /∈ Γ. Then, Γ∪{ψ} and Γ∪{¬ψ} are not L–
consistent because Γ is a maximal consistent set of L. So, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ,
ψ1, . . . , ψm ∈ Γ such that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ L and ψ1, . . . , ψm,¬ψ L . Therefore, by
Rule WL, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψm, ϕ L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψm,¬ϕ L .So, by
Rule ∨L, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψm, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ L . However, ¬ψ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ by Fact 2
and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψm ∈ Γ, so Γ is not L–consistent, which is impossible. So,
¬ψ ∈ Γ, which proves the other direction.
• ϕ := ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: Mc,Γ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff Mc,Γ ϕ1 and Mc,Γ Γ2 by definition, iff
ϕ1 ∈ Γ and ϕ2 ∈ Γ by induction hypothesis. Now, we prove that ϕ1 ∈ Γ and
ϕ2 ∈ Γ iff ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
First, we prove that if ϕ1 ∈ Γ and ϕ2 ∈ Γ then ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ. By the Axiom, we
have that ϕ1 L ϕ1 and ϕ2 L ϕ2. So, by Rule WL, we have that ϕ1, ϕ2 L ϕ1 and
ϕ1, ϕ2 L ϕ2. Then, by ∧R, ϕ1, ϕ2 L ϕ1∧ϕ2. But ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Γ. Therefore, by Lemma
3, we have that ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
Second, we prove that ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ entails that ϕ1 ∈ Γ and ϕ2 ∈ Γ. Assume that
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ and assume towards a contradiction that ϕ1 /∈ Γ (the proof when
ϕ2 /∈ Γ is similar). Then, because Γ is a maximal consistent set, Γ∪{ϕ1} is not L–
consistent. Then, there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ψn L . Therefore,
ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ψ1, . . . , ψn L by ∧1L. But ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ Γ and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Γ. So, Γ is not
L–consistent, which is impossible by assumption. Therefore, ϕ1 ∈ Γ. We prove
similarly that ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
• ϕ := ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2: Mc,Γ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff Mc,Γ ϕ1 or Mc,Γ ϕ2 by definition, iff
ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ by induction hypothesis. Now, we prove that ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ
iff ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
First, we prove that if ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ then ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Γ. Assume towards a
contradiction that ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 /∈ Γ. Then, Γ∪ {ϕ1 ∨ϕ2} is not L–consistent. So, there
are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ψ1, . . . , ψn L . However, ϕ1 L ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. So,
by the Cut rule, ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ψn L . Likewise, because ϕ2 L ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, we have by
the Cut rule that ϕ2, ψ1, . . . , ψn L . Therefore, in both cases (ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ),
we obtain that Γ is not L–consistent, because ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ. This is impossible.
Thus, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
Second, we prove that if ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Γ then ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ. Assume
that ϕ1 /∈ Γ and that ϕ2 /∈ Γ. Then, Γ ∪ {ϕ1} is not L–consistent be-
cause Γ is a maximal consistent set. So, there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that
ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ψn L . Likewise, Γ ∪ {ϕ2} is not L–consistent because Γ is a maxi-
mal L–consistent set. So, there are ψ′1, . . . , ψ′m ∈ Γ such that ϕ2, ψ′1, . . . , ψ′l L .
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Then, ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ψn, ψ
′
1, . . . , ψ
′
m L by Rules WL and ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ψk, ψ
′
1, . . . , ψ
′
l L
also by WL. Hence, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ψ1, . . . , ψk, ψ′1, . . . , ψ′l L by ∨L. However, ϕ1 ∨
ϕ2, ψ1, . . . , ψk, ψ
′
1, . . . , ψ
′
l ∈ Γ. So, Γ is not L–consistent. This is impossible. So,
either ϕ1 ∈ Γ or ϕ2 ∈ Γ.
• ϕ := jψ: assume that Mc,Γ jψ. We are going to show that jψ ∈ Γ. Let
S := {¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ : jϕ ∈ Γ} and assume that S satisfies (1). Then, S can be
extended to a maximal L–consistent set S+ by Lemma 4. Now, ψ /∈ S+ because
¬ψ ∈ S. So, Mc, S+ ¬ψ. Moreover, S+ ∈ Rj(Γ) by definition of Rj . Hence,
Mc,Γ ♦j¬ψ. This is impossible by assumption. So, S is not L–consistent. So,
there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ S such that ¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L . Then, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L ¬¬ψ by
Rule ¬L. So, by Rule k, jϕ1, . . . ,jϕn L j¬¬ψ. Moreover, jϕ1, . . . ,jϕn ∈
Γ. So, because Γ is a maximal consistent set of L, j¬¬ψ ∈ Γ by Lemma 3.
Moreover, ¬¬ψ L ψ, so j¬¬ψ L jψ by Rule k. So, again by application of
Lemma 3, jψ ∈ Γ.
Assume that jψ ∈ Γ. Then, for all Γ′ such that Γ′ ∈ Rj(Γ), we have that ψ ∈ Γ′.
Therefore, Mc,Γ′ ψ. So, Mc,Γ jψ by definition.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of soundness is routine, so we only prove completeness,
i.e., we prove that for all LR–sequent X Y , if X Y holds then X L Y holds. Assume
towards a contradiction that X Y and that it is not the case that X L Y . However,
X,¬Y L iff X L Y by application of Rule ¬L, the Cut rule and using the fact that
¬¬Y L Y . So, it is not the case that the set of formulas {X,¬Y } is L-consistent. So,
by Lemma 4, it can be extended into a maximal L-consistent set Γ. Then, by the Truth
Lemma 6, we have that Mc,Γ X,¬Y . Hence, it is not the case that X Y . This
contradicts our assumption and this completes the proof.
4.2 A Gentzen Calculus for Update Logic
In this section, we introduce a sound and complete Gentzen calculus for update logic.
Definition 19 (Sequent calculus LR). The sequent calculus for LR, denoted LR, is
defined by adding to the base sequent calculus for modal logic of Figure 7 the rules for
the substructural connectives given in Figure 8. Note that the sequents of LR are all LR–
sequents, except for the Modal Rule where they are either L–sequents or Lα–sequents.
A LR–sequent X Y is provable in LR, written X LR Y , when it can be derived from
the axioms and inference rules of LR in a finite number of steps. 
Theorem 7 (Soundness and completeness). For all LR-sequents X Y , it holds that
X LR Y iff X Y .
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 7. First, we define the notions of LR–
consistent set and maximal LR–consistent set over the sets of LR–structures Sϕ and the
sets of Lα–structures Sα. To do so, we first introduce the following notation, which is
very similar to the notation used in the previous section for the modal language L: if
Y = ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Sα ∪ Sϕ′ , then ¬Y denotes ¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn.
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Axioms:
ϕ ϕ pϕ ¬pψ if ψ 6= ϕ
Structural Rules:
Weakening: Contraction: Permutation:
Γ(X) Y
Γ(Z,X) Y
WL
Γ(X,X) Y
Γ(X) Y
CL
Γ(Y,X) Z
Γ(X,Y ) Z
PL
X Y
X Y,Z
WR
X Y,Z,Z
X Y,Z
CR
X Y,ψ, ϕ, Z
X Y,ϕ, ψ, Z
PR
Cut Rule:
X ϕ Γ(ϕ) Y
Γ(X) Y
Cut
Logical Rules:
Propositional Rules:
X Y,ϕ
X,¬ϕ Y ¬R
X,ϕ Y
X Y,¬ϕ ¬L
Γ(ϕ) Y
Γ(ϕ ∧ ψ) Y ∧
1
L
Γ(ψ) Y
Γ(ϕ ∧ ψ) Y ∧
2
L
X Y,ϕ X Y,ψ
X Y,ϕ ∧ ψ ∧R
X Y,ϕ
X Y,ϕ ∨ ψ ∨
1
R
X Y,ψ
X Y,ϕ ∨ ψ ∨
2
R
Γ(ϕ) Y Γ(ψ) Y
Γ(ϕ ∨ ψ) Y ∨L
Modal Rule:
X ϕ
jX jϕ
k
where the L–structure jX is defined inductively as follows: jX := jϕ if X = ϕ
and jX := jY,jZ if X = Y,Z.
Figure 7: Sequent Calculus LR: Axioms, Structural Rules and Rules for ¬,∧,∨,j
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X;α ϕ
X α ⊃ ϕ ⊃R
Xα α Γ(ϕ) X
Γ(α ⊃ ϕ;Xα) X ⊃L
X ϕ Xα α
X;Xα ϕ ◦ α ◦R
Γ(ϕ;α) ψ
Γ(ϕ ◦ α) ψ ◦L
ϕ;Xα ψ
Xα ψ ⊂ ϕ ⊂R
X ϕ Γ(ψ) Y
Γ(X;ψ ⊂ ϕ) Y ⊂L
Figure 8: Sequent Calculus LR: Rules for ◦,⊃,⊂
Definition 20 (LR–consistent set and maximal LR–consistent set of Sϕ and Sα).
• A LR–consistent set Γ of Sϕ is a set of LR–structures of Sϕ such that there is no
X ∈ Sϕ and Y ∈ Sϕ′ such that X LR ¬Y .
• A maximal LR–consistent set of Sϕ is a consistent set Γ of Sϕ such that there is
no X ∈ Sϕ such that X /∈ Γ and Γ ∪ {X} is LR–consistent.
Similar definitions hold for the Lα–structures Sα. 
Some preliminary results. We prove some facts and lemmata which will be used in
the very completeness proof.
Lemma 8. Let Γ be a maximal LR–consistent set. For all ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ Γ, all ϕ ∈ LR,
if ϕ1, . . . , ϕk LR ϕ then ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same reasoning as Lemma 3.
Now, we need to prove new results in order to deal with the new connectives ◦,⊃,⊂
and “;” of update logic.
Definition 21. We define inductively the following translation t from LR–structures
and Lα–structures to formulas of LR:
t(ϕ) = ϕ
t(X,Y ) = t(X) ∧ t(Y )
t(X;Y ) = t(X) ◦ t(Y ) 
Fact 3. For all update models MR, all x ∈ MR and all LR–structure or Lα–structure
X,
MR, x X iff MR, x t(X). (12)
Let Γ be a maximal LR-consistent set of LR–structures or Lα–structures. Then, for all
LR–structures or Lα–structures X, it holds that
t(X) ∈ Γ iff X ∈ Γ. (13)
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Proof. The proof of Expression (12) is by a direct induction on X. We prove the direction
from left to right of Expression (13). Assume that t(X) ∈ Γ and that Γ ∪ {X} is not
LR-consistent. Then, there is Y ∈ Sϕ such that Y,X LR . So, Y, t(X) LR by rules ◦L,∧1L, ∧2L and CL. But then, because t(X) ∈ Γ, Γ is not LR-consistent, which is impossible.
So, Γ ∪ {X} is LR-consistent. Therefore, because Γ is a maximal LR-consistent set, we
have that X ∈ Γ.
Now, we prove the direction from right to left of Expression (13) by contraposition.
Assume that t(X) /∈ Γ. Then, because Γ is a maximal LR–consistent set, there are
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ such that t(X), ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR . So, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR ¬t(X) by ¬R, and
therefore ¬t(X) ∈ Γ by Lemma 8. However, X LR t(X), so X,¬t(X) LR by ¬L, and
X,¬t(X) ∈ Γ ∪ {X}. Therefore, Γ ∪ {X} is not LR-consistent. Hence, X /∈ Γ. This
proves the second direction.
Fact 4. The following axioms and inference rules are derivable in LR:
Γ((X;Xα), (X;Y α)) Y
Γ(X; (Xα, Y α)) Y
(; /, )
(14)
Γ((X;Xα), (Y ;Xα)) Z
Γ((X,Y );Xα) Z
(, /; )
(15)
ϕ ◦ (α ∨ β) LR (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ϕ ◦ β) (16)
(ϕ ∨ ψ) ◦ α LR (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ψ ◦ α) (17)
α1 ⊃ ϕ, . . . , αn ⊃ ϕ LR (α1 ∨ . . . ∨ αn) ⊃ ϕ (18)
ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn LR ψ ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) (19)
Proof. We prove the derivability of each axiom or inference rule:
• The proofs of Rule (; /, ) of Expression (14) and of Rule (, /; ) of Expression (15)
are by application of rules WL and CL.
• Now, we give the full proof of ϕ◦(α∨β) LR (ϕ◦α)∨(ϕ◦β): the proof of Expression
(17) is similar.
ϕ ϕ α α
ϕ;α ϕ ◦ α ◦R
ϕ;α (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ϕ ◦ β) WR,∨R
ϕ ϕ β β
ϕ;β ϕ ◦ β ◦R
ϕ;α (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ϕ ◦ β) WR,∨R
ϕ;α ∨ β (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ϕ ◦ β) ∨L
ϕ ◦ (α ∨ β) (ϕ ◦ α) ∨ (ϕ ◦ β) ◦L
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• By iterated application of ⊃L to α1 LR α1, . . . , αn LR αn and ϕ, . . . , ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
LR ϕ, we
obtain that (α1 ⊃ ϕ;α1), . . . , (αn ⊃ ϕ;αn) LR ϕ. Therefore, (α1 ⊃ ϕ, . . . , αn ⊃
ϕ;α1), . . . , (αn ⊃ ϕ, . . . , αn ⊃ ϕ;αn) LR ϕ by Rule WL. So, α1 ⊃ ϕ, . . . , αn ⊃
ϕ;α1∨. . .∨αn LR ϕ by Rule ∨L. So, finally, α1 ⊃ ϕ, . . . , αn ⊃ ϕ LR α1∨. . .∨αn ⊃ ϕ
by Rule ⊃R.
• Finally, we prove that ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn LR ψ ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn). By iterated
application of ⊂L to ϕ1 LR ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR ϕn and ψ, . . . , ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
LR ψ, we have that
(ϕ1;ψ ⊂ ϕ1), . . . , (ϕn;ψ ⊂ ϕn) LR ψ. Therefore, by Rule WL, we have that
(ϕ1;ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn), . . . , (ϕn;ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn) LR ψ. So, by Rule ∨L,
(ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ ϕn;ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn), . . . , (ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ ϕn;ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn) LR ψ.
So, by CL, ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn;ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn) LR ψ. Finally, by ⊂R, we obtain
that ψ ⊂ ϕ1, . . . , ψ ⊂ ϕn LR ψ ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn).
Fact 5. Let ϕ ∈ LϕR and α ∈ LαR. If ϕ ◦α is LR-consistent, then ϕ is LR-consistent and
α is LR-consistent.
Proof. We prove that ϕ is LR-consistent and then we do it for α:
• Assume towards a contradiction that ϕ is not LR-consistent, that is ϕ LR . Then,
we have the following reasoning:
ϕ LR
ϕ LR α ⊃ ϕ
CR
α LR α ϕ LR
α ⊃ ϕ;α LR
⊃L
ϕ;α LR
Cut
ϕ ◦ α LR
◦L
As a consequence, we obtain that ϕ ◦ α is not LR–consistent, which is impossible
by assumption. Therefore, ϕ is LR-consistent.
• The proof that α is LR–consistent is similar. Assume that it is not, that is, α LR .
Then, we have the following reasoning:
α LR
α LR ⊥ ⊂ ϕ
CR
ϕ LR ϕ ⊥ LR
ϕ;⊥ ⊂ ϕ LR
⊃L
ϕ;α LR
Cut
ϕ ◦ α LR
◦L
As a consequence, we obtain that ϕ ◦ α is not LR–consistent, which is impossible
by assumption. Therefore, α is LR-consistent.
Then, we have the following Lindenbaum-like lemma:
Lemma 9. Any LR–consistent set over Sϕ (Sα) can be extended into a maximal LR–
consistent set over Sϕ (resp. Sα).
Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as the proof of Lemma 4.
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The completeness proof. We are ready to prove the completeness of LR. First, we
define the canonical update model associated to LR.
Definition 22 (Canonical update model). The canonical update model associated to LR
is the LR-model Mc := (Sc, Rc1, . . . Rcm,R⊃,R⊂,R◦, Ic) defined as follows:
• Sc is the disjoint union of the set Cϕ of all maximal LR–consistent sets of Sϕ and
the set Cα of all maximal LR–consistent sets of Sα;
• for all Γ,Γ′,Γf ∈ Cϕ, all Γα ∈ Cα, all j = 1, . . . ,m,
(Γ,Γ′) ∈ Rcj iff for all jϕ ∈ Γ, we have that ϕ ∈ Γ′
(Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R⊃ iff for all α ⊃ ϕ ∈ Γ, if α ∈ Γα then ϕ ∈ Γf
(Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R⊂ iff for all ϕf ⊂ ϕ ∈ Γα, if ϕ ∈ Γ then ϕf ∈ Γf
(Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R◦ iff for all ϕ ∈ Γ and all α ∈ Γα, ϕ ◦ α ∈ Γf
• for all p ∈ ATM , all ψ ∈ L,
p ∈ Ic(Γ) iff p ∈ Γ
pψ ∈ Ic(Γα) iff pψ ∈ Γα

Lemma 10. It holds that R⊃ = R⊂ = R◦.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 11.25 of (Restall, 2000).
Hence, from now on, we will denote this relation R := R⊃ = R⊂ = R◦.
Lemma 11 (Truth lemma). For all LR-structure X, for all maximal consistent set Γ,
we have that
Mc,Γ X iff X ∈ Γ. (20)
Proof. The proof is by induction on the LR–structure X. We start with the base case
where X := ϕ is a formula of LR. Then, we will deal with the cases where X is of the
form X,Y or X;Xα.
The boolean cases are dealt with the same reasoning as in the previous section for
modal logic. So, we only deal with the new connectives (we also recall the case for the
modal operator).
• ϕ := jψ: assume that Mc,Γ jψ. We are going to show that jψ ∈ Γ.
Let S := {¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ : jϕ ∈ Γ} and assume that S satisfies (1). Then, S can
be extended to a maximal LR–consistent set S+ by Lemma 9. Now, ψ /∈ S+
because ¬ψ ∈ S. So, Mc, S+ ¬ψ. Moreover, S+ ∈ Rj(Γ) by definition of
Rj . Hence, Mc,Γ ♦j¬ψ. This is impossible by assumption. So, S is not LR–
consistent. So, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ S such that ¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR . Then,
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR ¬¬ψ by Rule ¬L. So, by Rule k, jϕ1, . . . ,jϕn LR j¬¬ψ.
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Moreover, jϕ1, . . . ,jϕn ∈ Γ. So, because Γ is a maximal consistent set of L,
j¬¬ψ ∈ Γ by Lemma 8. Moreover, ¬¬ψ LR ψ, so j¬¬ψ LR jψ by Rule k.
So, again by application of Lemma 8, jψ ∈ Γ.
Assume that jψ ∈ Γ. Then, for all Γ′ such that Γ′ ∈ Rj(Γ), we have that ψ ∈ Γ′.
Therefore, Mc,Γ′ ψ. So, Mc,Γ jψ by definition.
• ϕ := α ⊃ ψ:
Assume that α ⊃ ψ ∈ Γ. Then, for all Γα,Γf such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, if α ∈ Γα
then ψ ∈ Γf . That is, for all Γα,Γf such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, ifMc,Γα α then
Mc,Γf ψ by induction hypothesis. That is, Mc,Γ α ⊃ ψ.
Assume thatMc,Γ α ⊃ ψ and assume towards a contradiction that α ⊃ ψ /∈ Γ.
1. Assume that S := {ϕ : α ⊃ ϕ ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬ψ} is not LR–consistent. Then, there
are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ S such that ¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR . Hence, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR ¬¬ψ.
So, because α LR α, we have that α ⊃ ϕ1, . . . , α ⊃ ϕn;α LR ¬¬ψ by iterated
applications of Rules ⊃L and (, /; ) of Expression (15). Then, α ⊃ ϕ1, . . . , α ⊃
ϕn LR α ⊃ ¬¬ψ (∗) by Rule ⊃R. Then, again by application of Lemma 8 to (∗),
we have that α ⊃ ¬¬ψ ∈ Γf . Therefore, because α ⊃ ¬¬ψ LR α ⊃ ψ, we have
by application of Lemma 8 that α ⊃ ψ ∈ Γf . This is impossible. Therefore, S is
LR–consistent and by Lemma 9 it can be extended into a maximal consistent set
called Γf .
2. Now, let Sα := {α}∪
{¬β : there is ψ /∈ Γf , β ⊃ ψ ∈ Γ}. Assume that Sα is not
LR–consistent. Then, there are ¬β1, . . . ,¬βn ∈ Sα such that α,¬β1, . . . ,¬βn LR .
So, α LR β1, . . . , βn by ¬R and the Cut rule. Therefore, α LR β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βn. Let
β1, . . . , βn be the formulas of Γ
f associated to ψ1, . . . , ψn. Then,
∨
i
ψi LR
∨
i
ψi.
Then, by application of ⊃L, we have that (β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βn) ⊃
∨
i
ψi;α LR
∨
i
ψi. So, by
application of ⊃R we have that (β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βn) ⊃
∨
i
ψi LR α ⊃
∨
i
ψi (∗). However,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, βi LR βi and ψi LR
∨
i
ψi, so by application of ⊃L, we
have that βi ⊃ ψi;βi LR
∨
i
ψi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Therefore, by ⊃R, we have
that βi ⊃ ψi LR βi ⊃
∨
i
ψi. Now, by Expression (18) of Fact 4, we have that
β1 ⊃
∨
i
ψi, . . . , βn ⊃
∨
i
ψi LR (β1 ∨ . . . ∨ βn) ⊃
∨
i
ψi (∗∗). So, by the Cut rule
applied to (∗) and (∗∗), we have that β1 ⊃
∨
i
ψi, . . . , βn ⊃
∨
i
ψi LR α ⊃
∨
i
ψi.
Therefore, by iterated application of Lemma 8, we have that α ⊃ ∨
i
ψi ∈ Γ, because
β1 ⊃
∨
i
ψi, . . . , βn ⊃
∨
i
ψi ∈ Γ. Hence,
∨
i
ψi ∈ S by definition of S. So,
∨
i
ψi ∈ Γf by
definition of Γf . However, for all i, ψi /∈ Γf . But for all i, ψi LR ψi, so ψi,¬ψi LR
by ¬L and ψi,
∧
i
¬ψi LR by ∧L. So,
∨
i
ψi,
∧
i
¬ψi LR by ∨L and WL. But for all
i, ¬ψi ∈ Γf , so
∧
i
¬ψi ∈ Γf and
∨
i
ψi ∈ Γf . This is impossible. Therefore, Sα is
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LR–consistent. So, it can be extended into a maximal LR–consistent set called Γα.
Finally, we need to check that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R. Let β ⊃ ϕ ∈ Γ and assume that
β ∈ Γα but ϕ /∈ Γf . Then, by definition of Γα, ¬β ∈ Γα, which contradicts
the fact that β ∈ Γα. So, ϕ ∈ Γf . Hence, there are (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R such that
α ∈ Γα and ¬ψ ∈ Γf . So, there are (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R such that Mc,Γα α
and Mc,Γf ¬ψ by Induction Hypothesis. Therefore, Mc,Γ 2 α ⊃ ψ, which
contradicts our assumption. We have reached a contradiction, so, finally, α ⊃ ψ ∈
Γ.
• ϕ := ψ ⊂ χ:
Assume that ψ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα. Then, for all Γ,Γf ∈ Mc such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R,
if χ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γf . Then, for all Γ,Γf ∈ Mc such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, if
Mc,Γ χ then Mc,Γf ψ. That is, Mc,Γα ψ ⊂ χ.
Assume that Mc,Γα ψ ⊂ χ. Assume towards a contradiction that ψ ⊂ χ /∈ Γα.
1. Let Sf := {¬ψ} ∪ {ϕ : ϕ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα} and assume that Sf is not LR–consistent.
Then, there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Sf such that ¬ψ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕn LR . So, because χ LR χ,
by iterated application of Rules ⊂L and (; /, ) of Expression (14), we have that
χ; (ϕ1 ⊂ χ, . . . , ϕn ⊂ χ) LR ψ. Hence, ϕ1 ⊂ χ, . . . , ϕn ⊂ χ LR ψ ⊂ χ by Rule ⊂R.
But ϕ1 ⊂ χ, . . . , ϕn ⊂ χ ∈ Γα, so ψ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα again by application of Lemma 8.
This is impossible by assumption. Therefore, Sf is LR–consistent. Then, Sf can
be extended into a maximal LR–consistent set Γf ∈Mc by Lemma 9.
2. Now, let S := {χ} ∪ {¬ϕ : there is ψ /∈ Γf such that ψ ⊂ ϕ ∈ Γα}. As-
sume that S is not LR–consistent. Then, there are ¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn ∈ S such that
χ,¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn LR . Then, χ LR ϕ1, . . . , ϕn by Rule ¬L and the Cut Rule.
So, χ LR ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn. Let ψ1, . . . , ψn be the formulas of Γf associated to
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn through S. Then, because
∨
i
ψi LR
∨
i
ψi, we have that χ;
∨
i
ψi ⊂
(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) LR
∨
i
ψi by Rule ⊂L. Therefore,
∨
i
ψi ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) LR
∨
i
ψi ⊂
χ (∗) by Rule ⊂R. However, we have that
∨
i
ψi ⊂ ϕi ∈ Γα for all i and, by Expres-
sion (19) of Fact 4,
∨
i
ψi ⊂ ϕ1, . . . ,
∨
i
ψi ⊂ ϕn LR
∨
i
ψi ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn). Therefore,
by application of Lemma 8, we have that
∨
i
ψi ⊂ (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) ∈ Γα. Then, by
application of Lemma 8 to (∗), we have that ∨
i
ψi ⊂ χ ∈ Γα. Then, by definition of
Sf , we have that
∨
i
ψi ∈ Sf . So,
∨
i
ψi ∈ Γf . However, ψi /∈ Γf for all i. Therefore,∧
i
¬ψi ∈ Γf , contradicting
∨
i
ψi ∈ Γf . Hence, we reach a contradiction. Therefore,
S is LR–consistent. So, it can be extended to a maximal LR–consistent set Γ ∈Mc
by Lemma 9.
Now, we prove that we have (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R. Let ψ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα and assume towards
a contradiction that χ ∈ Γ but ψ /∈ Γf . Then, ¬χ ∈ S by definition of S, so
¬χ ∈ Γ. This is impossible because χ ∈ Γ and Γ is a maximal LR–consistent set.
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So, if χ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γf . So, for all ψ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα, if χ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γf . Hence,
(Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R.
Moreover, χ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ Γf , so by Induction Hypothesis, Mc,Γ χ and not
Mc,Γf ψ. Therefore, we do not have thatMc,Γα ψ ⊂ χ, which is impossible
by assumption. So, finally, ψ ⊂ χ ∈ Γα.
• ϕ := ψ ◦ α:
Assume that ϕ ◦ α ∈ Γf . We must show that Mc,Γf ϕ ◦ α, that is, there are
Γ,Γα ∈ Mc such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, Mc,Γ ϕ and Mc,Γα α, i.e., there
are Γ,Γα ∈ Mc such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Γ and α ∈ Γα. We construct the
maximal consistent sets Γ and Γα following the steps described in the ‘pseudo’-
Algorithm 1 (we call it ‘pseudo’-Algorithm because it is not terminating, we only
introduce it in order to better explain the way we construct Γ and Γα).
We prove that the ‘pseudo’-Algorithm 1 is well-defined. To do so, we prove that
for all n ∈ N,
(
∧
Γn ∧ ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ αn) ∈ Γf or
(
∧
Γn ∧ ¬ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ αn) ∈ Γf or
(
∧
Γn ∧ ¬ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ ¬αn) ∈ Γf or
(
∧
Γn ∧ ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ ¬αn) ∈ Γf
(21)
(The “or” is inclusive.) Expression (21) is due to the fact that for all ϕ,ψ ∈ LϕR,
all α, β ∈ LαR, we can prove the following:
ψ ◦ β LR (ψ ∧ ϕ) ◦ (β ∧ α) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) ◦ (β ∧ α)∨
(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) ◦ (β ∧ ¬α) ∨ (ψ ∧ ϕ) ◦ (β ∧ ¬α) (22)
To prove Expression (22), we use Expression (16) of Fact 4 and the fact that
ψ◦β LR ((ψ∧ϕ)∨(ψ∧¬ϕ))◦((β∧α)∨(β∧¬α)), which is itself proved by application
of rules ◦R and then ◦L to ψ LR (ψ ∧ ϕ) ∨ (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) and β LR (β ∧ α) ∨ (β ∧ ¬α).
Replacing in Expression (22) ψ with
∧
Γn, β with
∧
Γαn, ϕ with ϕn and α with
αn, and using Lemma 8 together with the fact that
∧
Γn ◦
∧
Γαn ∈ Γf , we obtain
the result of Expression (21), because Γf is a maximal consistent set. So, the
‘pseudo’-algorithm is well-defined.
Now, we prove that Γ and Γα are maximal consistent sets of Sϕ and Sα respectively.
By Fact 5, for all n ∈ N, Γn and Γαn are LR-consistent, because
∧
Γn ◦
∧
Γαn is LR-
consistent since
∧
Γn ◦
∧
Γαn ∈ Γf and Γf is LR-consistent. So, at line 22 of the
‘pseudo’-algorithm, Γ0 and Γ
α
0 are also LR-consistent, since otherwise there would
be a n such that Γn and Γ
α
n are not LR-consistent. Hence, Γ and Γα are also
LR-consistent at the end of the ‘pseudo’-algorithm by definition of the rest of the
‘pseudo’-algorithm. Moreover, by construction of Γ and Γα, because all pairs of
Sϕ × Sα are enumerated, Γ and Γα are maximal consistent sets of Sϕ and Sα
respectively.
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Algorithm 1
Require: (ϕ, α) ∈ LϕR × LαR and a maximal LR–consistent set Γf of LϕR.
Ensure: A pair of maximal LR-consistent sets (Γ,Γα) such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, ϕ ∈ Γ
and α ∈ Γα.
Let (ϕ0, α0), . . . , (ϕn, αn), . . . be an enumeration of LϕR × LαR and let
(X0, X
α
0 ), . . . , (Xn, X
α
n ), . . . be an enumeration of Sϕ × Sα − LϕR × LαR
Γ0 := {ϕ}
5: Γα0 := {α}
For all n ≥ 0 do
if (
∧
Γn ∧ ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ αn) ∈ Γf then
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {ϕn}
10: Γαn+1 := Γ
α
n ∪ {αn}
else if (
∧
Γn ∧ ¬ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ αn) ∈ Γf then
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {¬ϕn}
Γαn+1 := Γ
α
n ∪ {αn}
else if (
∧
Γn ∧ ¬ϕn) ◦ (
∧
Γαn ∧ ¬αn) ∈ Γf then
15: Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {¬ϕn}
Γαn+1 := Γ
α
n ∪ {¬αn}
else
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {ϕn}
Γαn+1 := Γ
α
n ∪ {¬αn}
20: end if
Γ0 :=
⋃
n≥0
Γn
Γα0 :=
⋃
n≥0
Γαn
25: For all n ≥ 0 do
if Γn ∪ {Xn} is LR-consistent then
Γn+1 := Γn ∪ {Xn}
end if
if Γαn ∪ {Xαn } is LR-consistent then
30: Γαn+1 := Γ
α
n ∪ {Xn}
end if
Γ :=
⋃
n≥0
Γn
Γα :=
⋃
n≥0
Γαn
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Finally, we need to prove that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R. To do so, it suffices to prove that
for all ϕ ∈ Γ, all α ∈ Γα, ϕ ◦ α ∈ Γf by Definition 22 of the canonical model. Let
ϕ ∈ Γ and let α ∈ Γα. Then, there is n ∈ N such that (ϕ, α) = (ϕn, αn). Then, by
definition of the algorithm, we must have that (Γn ∧ ϕ)◦(Γαn ∧ α) ∈ Γf . Therefore,
because Γn∧ϕ LR ϕ and Γαn∧α LR α, we have that (Γn ∧ ϕ)◦(Γαn ∧ α) LR ϕ◦α by
application of rules ◦R and then ◦L. Thus, ϕ ◦ α ∈ Γf by Lemma 8, and therefore
(Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R.
Now, we prove the converse, that is, ifMc,Γf ϕ◦α, then ϕ◦α ∈ Γf . By definition
of ◦, we have that there are Γ and Γα such that (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R, Mc,Γ ϕ and
Mc,Γα α. So, by Induction Hypothesis, we have that ϕ ∈ Γ and α ∈ Γα. So,
by definition of R(= R◦), we must have that ϕ ◦ α ∈ Γf , since (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R.
This completes the proof.
Finally, we deal with the case where X is a LR–structure of the form X,Y or X;Xα.
These two cases are proved straightforwardly because Mc,Γ X iff Mc,Γ t(X) by
Expression (12) of Fact 3, becauseMc,Γ t(X) iff t(X) ∈ Γ by the preceding reasoning
(since t(X) ∈ LR), and finally because t(X) ∈ Γ iff X ∈ Γ by Expression (13) of Fact
3.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof of soundness is routine, so we only prove completeness,
i.e., we prove that for all LR–sequent X Y , if X Y holds then X LR Y holds.
Assume towards a contradiction that X Y and that it is not the case that X LR Y .
However, we have that X,¬Y LR iff X LR Y by application of ¬L (from right to
left) and by application of ¬R, the Cut rule and the fact that ¬¬Y LR Y (from left to
right). Then, the set {X,¬Y } is LR-consistent. So, by Lemma 9, it can be extended
into a maximal LR-consistent set Γ. Then, by the Truth Lemma 11, we have that
Mc,Γ X,¬Y . Hence, it is not the case that X Y . This contradicts our assumption
and this completes the proof.
5 Case Study: the DEL Product Update
So far, we did not impose any restriction on our ternary relation. Therefore, there is no
reason that it corresponds to the DEL product update of Definition 7 since this update
was of a very specific kind: it was deterministic, partial and bisimulation invariant. In
this section, we are going to investigate which axioms and inference rules need to be
added in order to recover our previous definition of the DEL product update. Doing so,
we will provide a new axiomatization of the DEL product update which is different and
more modular than the one proposed in (Aucher, 2011). Also, we will show that the
operators of progression, regression and epistemic planning introduced in (Aucher, 2011,
2012) are in fact specific instances of the standard operators of substructural logic.
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5.1 Towards a Correspondence Theory
The central object of our semantics is a ternary relation representing an update. Thanks
to our logical language, we can now elicit a number of axioms and inference rules that
define specific properties of this ternary relation. In other words, we can develop a
genuine correspondence theory for the notion of update.
Definition 23. Below, p ranges over ATM , ϕ,ψ, χ range over LϕR and α over LαR.
p;α p ¬p;α ¬p (Atom–p & Atom–¬p)
¬ψ; pψ (Precondition)
jϕ ◦jα j(ϕ ◦ α) (Back–update)
ϕ;α ϕf
♦j(ϕ ∧ χ);♦j(α ∧ pχ) ♦jϕf (Forth–update)

(Atom–p & Atom–¬p) illustrate the fact that we deal as in the standard framework of
DEL with epistemic events, i.e. events which do not change atomic facts. Axiom schema
(Precondition) illustrates the fact that an atomic event can occur only in a possible
world where its precondition holds. The reading of Axiom schema (Back–update) is as
follows: if the current situation results from the occurrence of an event during which j
believed that α in a situation where j believed that ϕ, then in this current situation, j
believes that it results from the occurrence of an event satisfying α in an initial situation
satisfying ϕ. As for Rule (Forth–update), it turns out that the informal motivations
for the definition of the DEL product update by Baltag and Moss (2004) are somehow
formalized by Rule (Forth–update). Here is how the product update was informally
motivated in this paper (the notations in this quotation are replaced by our notations):
“The update product restricts the full Cartesian product W × Wα to the
smaller set W ⊗Wα in order to insure that states survive actions in the ap-
propriate sense. [...] The components of our Lα-models are “simple actions”,
so the uncertainty regarding the action is assumed to be independent of the
uncertainty regarding the current (input) state. This independence allows
us to “multiply” these two uncertainties in order to compute the uncertainty
regarding the output state: if whenever the input state is w, agent j thinks
the input might be some other state v, and if whenever the current action
happening is e, agent j thinks the current action might be some other ac-
tion f , and if v survives f , then whenever the output state (w, e) is reached,
agent j thinks the alternative output state (v, f) might have been reached.”
(Baltag and Moss, 2004, p. 194)
Now, if one thinks of formulas ϕ, α and ϕf in Rule (Forth–update) as representing
respectively the input state v, the action f and the output state (v, f), then the
conclusion of this rule somehow formalizes these informal motivations.
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Note that the Axiom schemata (Atom–p & Atom–¬p) and (Precondition) correspond
to the Axiom schemata A4,A5 and A6 of (Aucher, 2011) respectively, and Rule (Forth–
update) corresponds to Rule R5 of (Aucher, 2011). Rule R4 of (Aucher, 2011) is derivable
from Axiom schema (Back–update) and the modal rule k:
ϕ;α ϕf
jϕ;jα jϕf
R4
In fact, we can even prove in LR together with (Back–update) an even stronger
inference rule which generalizes uniformly both Rules k and R4:
X ϕ
jX jϕ
k+
where jX is defined inductively as follows: jX := jϕ if X = ϕ, jX :=
(jY,jZ) if X = (Y, Z) and jX := (jY ;jZ) if X = (Y ;Z). Now, we define some
conditions on update models that will correspond exactly to the validity of our above
axioms and inference rules.
Definition 24. Let MR = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R, I) be an update model. Then,
MR satisfies the conditions listed on the right hand side below when for all
((M, w), (E , e), (Mf , wf )) ∈ R,
• for all p ∈ ATM , M, w p iff Mf , wf p (Atom–p & Atom–¬p)
• M, w Iα(e) (Precondition)
• for all vf ∈ Rj(wf ), there are v ∈ Rj(w) and f ∈ Rj(e)
such that ((M, v), (E , f), (Mf , vf )) ∈ R. (Back–update)
• for all v ∈ Rj(w), all f ∈ Rj(e), if M, v Iα(f) then
there is vf ∈ Rj(wf ) such that ((M, v), (E , f), (Mf , vf )) ∈ R (Forth–update)

Then, we have the following correspondence results:
Theorem 12 (Canonicity). Let S ⊆ {(Atom–p & Atom–¬p), (Precondition), (Back–
update), (Forth–update)} The sequent calculus LR+S is sound and complete w.r.t. the
class of update models satisfying the corresponding conditions of S (given in Definition
24).
Proof. Soundness is routine. We only prove completeness of (Back–update) and (Forth–
update). The proofs for the other cases are without particular difficulty.
(Back–update): Given a LR + (Back–update)–consistent set Γ of LR, it suffices to
find an update model MR and x ∈ MR such that (1) MR, x Γ and (2) MR sat-
isfies the condition (Back–update). Let Mc = (Pc,R1, . . . ,Rm,Rc, Ic) be the canon-
ical model for LR + (Back–update) as defined in the proof of Theorem 7, and let Γ+
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be any LR + (Back–update)-consistent maximal extension of Γ obtained by Lemma
9. Then, by Lemma 11, Mc,Γ+ Γ, so step (1) is established. It remains to show
that Mc satisfies condition (Back–update). Let (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ R and let Γf1 ∈ Rj(Γf ).
Let (ϕ10, α
1
0), . . . , (ϕ
1
n, α
1
n), . . . be a countable enumeration of S := S
ϕ × Sα, where
Sϕ := {ϕ ∈ LϕR : jϕ ∈ Γ} and Sα := {α ∈ LαR : jα ∈ Γα}. We concatenate
to this enumeration an arbitrary countable enumeration of Sϕ × Sα − S. This yields
a countable enumeration (ϕ0, α0), . . . , (ϕn, αn), . . . of Sϕ × Sα. Then, we apply the
‘pseudo’-Algorithm 1 with Γ0 := ∅ and Γα0 := ∅. This yields two sets Γ1 and Γα1 . Be-
cause our enumeration starts with the formulas of S, we are sure to obtain that Sϕ ⊆ Γ1
and Sα ⊆ Γα1 . Indeed, because jϕ◦jα ∈ Γf for all ϕ ∈ Sϕ and α ∈ Sα, we must have
that j(ϕ◦α) ∈ Γf by Axiom (Back–update). Therefore, because Γf1 ∈ Rj(Γf ), we must
have that ϕ ◦α ∈ Γf1 . This explains that during the execution of the ‘pseudo’-Algorithm
1, the first conditional will always be satisfied for the pairs of formulas of S since we
start our enumeration with them. Therefore, we will have that Sϕ ⊆ Γ1 and Sα ⊆ Γα1 .
So, by definition of Rj inMc, we have that Γ1 ∈ Rj(Γ) and Γα1 ∈ Rj(Γα). Moreover, by
the same argument as the one given after the ‘pseudo’-Algorithm 1, we must have that
(Γ1,Γ
α
1 ,Γ
f
1) ∈ R. This proves that Mc satisfies the condition (Back–update).
(Forth–update): Given a LR + (Forth–update)–consistent set Γ of LR, it suffices
to find an update model MR and x ∈ MR such that (1) MR, x Γ and (2) MR
satisfies condition (Forth–update). Let Mc = (Pc,Rc, Ic) be the canonical model for
LR + (Forth–update) as defined in the proof of Theorem 7, and let Γ+ be any LR +
(Forth–update)–consistent maximal extension of Γ. By Lemma 11, Mc,Γ+ Γ so
step (1) is established. It remains to show that Mc satisfies condition (Forth–update).
Let (Γ,Γα,Γf ) ∈ Rc and let Γ1 ∈ Rj(Γ), Γα1 ∈ Rj(Γα) such that Mc,Γ1 Iα(Γα1 ).
We are going to show that there is Γ′f ∈ Rj(Γf ) such that (Γ1,Γα1 ,Γ′f ) ∈ Rc. Let
us consider the following set of formulas: S := S1 ∪ S2, where S1 := {ψ : jψ ∈ Γf}
and S2 := {ϕ ◦ α : ϕ ∈ Γ1, α ∈ Γα1 }. We prove that S is LR + (Forth–update)-consistent.
Assume towards a contradiction that it is not. Then, there are ψ1, . . . , ψm ∈ S1 and
ϕ1 ◦ α1, . . . , ϕn ◦ αn ∈ S2 such that ψ1, . . . , ψm, ϕ1 ◦ α1, . . . , ϕn ◦ αn LR . Then, ϕ1 ◦
α1, . . . , ϕn ◦ αn LR ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψm by ¬R. Therefore, by soundness of LR, we have that
ϕ1 ◦ α1, . . . , ϕn ◦ αn, ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψm. Then, again by validity of the Cut Rule and
Rule ◦L, (ϕ1;α1), . . . , (ϕn;αn) ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn. Then, by soundness of Rules ∧L and
CL, (ϕ1;α1∧ . . .∧αn), . . . , (ϕn;α1∧ . . .∧αn) ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn. So, by soundness of Rule
(, /; ), ϕ1, . . . , ϕn;α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn. Then, again by soundness of Rules ∧L
and CL, CR, we have that ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn;α1∧. . .∧αn ¬(ψ1∧. . .∧ψn). So, for all ψ ∈ LϕR,
♦j(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn ∧ ψ);♦j(α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn ∧ pψ) ♦j¬(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn) (∗∗) by soundness of
Rule (Forth–update). Because Γα1 is a maximal consistent subset, there is pψ ∈ Γα1 such
that ψ ∈ Γ1, since by assumption Mc,Γ1 Iα(Γα1 ). So, Mc,Γ ♦j(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn ∧ ψ)
and Mc,Γα ♦j(α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn ∧ pψ). Therefore, by application of (∗∗), we obtain
that Mc,Γf ♦j¬(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn), that is, Mc,Γf ¬j(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn). However,
by definition of S1, Mc,Γf jψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ jψn, and therefore Mc,Γf j(ψ1 ∧
. . . ∧ ψn), which contradicts our last result. So, we reach a contradiction, therefore S is
LR+ (Forth–update)–consistent. By Lemma 9, we can extend it to a maximal consistent
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subset Γ′f of LR. Finally, we show that (1) Γ′f ∈ Rj(Γf ) and (2) (Γ1,Γα1 ,Γ′f ) ∈ Rc.
The first item follows from the definition of Rj and the fact that S1 ⊆ Γ′f . The second
item follows from the definition of Rc and the fact that S2 ⊆ Γ′f . This concludes the
proof.
Note that our completeness results for (Atom–p), (Atom–¬p), (Forth–update) and
(Precondition) are at the level of models and not frames, unlike (Back–update):
Proposition 13 (Definability). The LR–sequent (Back–update) defines on the class of
update frames the property ( Back–update) of Definition 24.
Proof. We have to show that for all update frames F , we have that F satisfies (Back–
update) iff F validates jϕ ◦ jα j(ϕ ◦ α). The left to right direction is routine,
so we only prove the right to left direction. We reason by contraposition. Assume
that an update frame F = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R) does not satisfy (Back–update). Then,
there is (w, e, wf ) ∈ R, there is vf ∈ Rj(wf ) such that for all v ∈ Rj(w), all f ∈
Rj(e), (v, f, vf ) /∈ R. Then, we set an interpretation I on F such that p ∈ I(u) iff
u ∈ Rj(w) and pψ ∈ I(u) iff u ∈ Rj(e) (∗∗) for a chosen p ∈ ATM and a chosen
ψ ∈ L. Then, (F , I), wf jp ◦ jpψ because (w, e, wf ) ∈ R. However, it holds that
(F , I), wf ♦j¬(p ◦ pψ) because vf ∈ Rj(wf ) and (F , I), vf ¬(p ◦ pψ) by condition
(∗∗). Hence, F does not validate jϕ ◦jα j(ϕ ◦ α), which concludes the first part
of the proof.
5.2 Characterization of the DEL Product Update
The following theorem shows that the DEL product update is entirely determined and
characterized (modulo bisimulation) by the axioms and inference rules (Atom–p & Atom–
¬p), (Precondition), (Forth–update), (Back–update):
Theorem 14 (Characterization Theorem). Let MR = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R, I) be an
update model. Then,
MR validates (Atom–p & Atom–¬p), (Precondition), (Forth–update), (Back–update)
iff
((M, w), (E , e), (Mf , wf )) ∈ R iff (Mf , wf ) - (M, w)⊗ (E , e).
Proof. The right to left direction is routine. To prove the left to right direction, we
use the correspondence results of Theorem 12. One can easily show that the relation
Z ⊆ (M⊗E)×Mf defined as follows is a bisimulation relation:
(M, w)⊗ (E , e)Z(Mf , wf ) iff ((M, w), (E , e), (Mf , wf )) ∈ R
As our denomination suggests, the conditions (Back–update) (together with (Precon-
dition)) and (Forth–update) somehow encode respectively the back and forth clauses of
bisimulation; the conditions (Atom–p & Atom–¬p) somehow encode the Atom clause of
bisimulation. This result generalizes the correspondence result for public announcement
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logic (van Benthem, 2007a) and solves an open problem raised by van Benthem (2011a).
Note that for the specific case of public announcement, we also had conditions resem-
bling the back and forth conditions of the definition of bisimulation. This leads us to
define the notion of a DEL product update model:
Definition 25 (DEL product update model). A DEL product update model is an update
model M⊗ = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R⊗, I) such that:
• P := (P,=) where P ⊆ C ∪ Cα;
• Rj ⊆ P × P is a positive two-place accessibility relation on P for each j ∈ AGT
such that for all x, y ∈ P, where x = (Mx, wx) and y = (My, wy):
x ∈ Rj(y) iff Mx =My and wx ∈ Rj(wy)
• R⊗ := {(x, y, z) ∈ C × Cα × C : x⊗ y - z} is a plump accessibility relation on P;
• I(x) := I(x), for all x ∈ C ∪ Cα. 
The DEL product update model is a LSub–model where points are pointed L–models
and pointed Lα–models. The ternary relation R⊗ is defined and motivated by the
explanations of the previous section. Note that the accessibility relations Rj of L–models
and Lα–models are seen in this definition as positive two-place accessibility relations Rj .
Fact 6. Any DEL product update model is an update model.
Proof. It follows straightforward from the definitions of update model and DEL product
update model.
Fact 7. The ternary relation R⊗ induced by the DEL product update is a plump
accessibility relation on the point set P = (C ∪ Cα,-). That is, for all
(M, w), (M′, w′) ∈ C, all (E , e), (E ′, e′) ∈ Cα and all (Mf , wf ), (M′f , w′f ) ∈ C such that
((M, w), (E , e), (Mf , wf )) ∈ R,
if (M, w) - (M′, w′), (E , e) - (E ′, e′) and (Mf , wf ) - (M′f , w′f ),
then ((M′, w′), (E ′, e′), (M′f , w′f )) ∈ R. (23)
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from the definition of the product update.
So, applying the DEL product update with bisimilar Lα–models yields the same
results (modulo bisimulation). But the converse turns out to be false: Lα–models may
have the same update effects without being bisimilar. In fact, there is a weaker notion
than bisimulation for Lα–models, called emulation (Eijck et al., 2012), that still fulfills
Expression (23).
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5.3 A Gentzen Calculus for DEL
Putting all our results together, we obtain an axiomatization of the DEL product update
which is different from the axiomatization of (Aucher, 2011). One of its advantage is
its modularity. Indeed, we do not need to resort to an external calculus to take into
account the base epistemic or event logic: this base calculus is already present in the
axiomatization at the same level than the other connectives of the language, and this
base calculus can also be modified or enriched.
Theorem 15 (Soundness and Completeness). Let A = {(Atom–p & Atom–¬p), (Pre-
condition), (Forth–update), (Back–update)}. Then, the cut-free sequent calculus L⊗ :=
LR+A is sound and complete for LR w.r.t. the class of DEL product update models.
Proof. The soundness is routine. The completeness proof is similar to Theorem 7 and
ultimately relies on Theorem 14.
5.4 DEL Operators are Substructural Operators
In this section, we will show that the DEL operators introduced in (Aucher, 2011, 2012)
correspond to the substructural operators ◦,⊃ and ⊂. We will also relate the work of van
Benthem on dynamic inference with the DEL–sequents of (Aucher, 2011, 2012; Aucher
et al., 2012).
5.4.1 Dynamic Inferences and DEL–sequents
Dynamic Inferences In the so-called ‘dynamic turn’, van Benthem was interested in
various dynamic styles of inference where propositions are procedures changing informa-
tion states. These dynamic styles of inference differ greatly from the classical Tarskian’s
valid inferences because the latter are supposed to transmit and preserve truth. Among
various dynamic styles of inference (such as the so-called test-test, update-update or
update-test consequence (van Benthem, 1991, 1996; Muskens et al., 2011)), he studied
the concrete following one, which can be defined within the DEL framework:
Definition 26 (Dynamic inference, van Benthem 2003). Let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ L. We
define the dynamic inference ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ψ as follows:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ϕ iff for all pointed L–model (M, w), and public announcement
Lα–models (E1, e1), . . . , (En, en) of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn respectively,
(M, w)⊗ (E1, e1)⊗ . . .⊗ (En, en) ϕ.

van Benthem noticed that various dynamic styles of inference obey structural rules
of inference which are non-classical. For example, all the structural rules of classical
logic of Figure 7 fail for dynamic inference, but the structural rules below characterize
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completely the dynamic inference (van Benthem, 2003) (below, −→ϕ stands for ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
and
−→
ψ stands for ψ1, . . . , ψn, where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ L):
if −→ϕ ϕ then ψ,−→ϕ ϕ (Left-Monotonicity)
if −→ϕ ϕ and −→ϕ ,ϕ,−→ψ ψ then −→ϕ ,−→ψ ψ (Left-Cut)
if −→ϕ ϕ and −→ϕ ,−→ψ ψ then −→ϕ ,ϕ,−→ψ ψ (Cautious Monotonicity)
DEL–sequents In (Aucher, 2011), I introduced what I called DEL–sequents. They
are a particular sort of dynamic inference and are defined as follows:
Definition 27 (DEL–sequent, Aucher 2011). Let ϕ,ϕf ∈ L and α ∈ Lα. We define the
logical consequence relation ϕ, α ϕf as follows:
ϕ, α ϕf iff for all pointed L–model (M, w), all Lα–model (E , e) such that
M, w Iα(e), M, w ϕ and E , e α, it holds that (M, w) ⊗
(E , e) ϕf .

In (Aucher et al., 2012), DEL–sequents are generalized to take into account sequences
of events and not only ‘one-shot’ occurrence of events. Several generalized DEL–sequents
are introduced in (Aucher et al., 2012) but they are all reducible to the following one:
Definition 28 (Generalized DEL–sequent, Aucher et al. 2012). Let ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ∈ L, let
α1, . . . , αn ∈ Lα and let ψ ∈ L. Then,
ϕ0, α1, ϕ1, . . . , αn, ϕn ψ
iff
if for all pointed L–model (M, w), and Lα–models (E1, e1), . . . , (En, en) such
that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ei, ei αi, (M, w)⊗(E1, e1)⊗. . .⊗(Ei, ei) is defined
and makes ϕi true, then it holds that (M, w)⊗ (E1, e1)⊗ . . .⊗ (En, en) ψ.

As one can easily notice, dynamic inferences can be translated into DEL–sequents
if we resort to the common knowledge/belief operator ∗AGTϕ (see for example (Fagin
et al., 1995) for a definition and a detailed study of this operator):
Proposition 16. Let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ ∈ L. Then, the following holds:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ϕ iff >, pϕ1 ∧∗AGT pϕ1 , . . . ,>, pϕn ∧∗AGT pϕn ,> ϕ ∧∗AGTϕ
Thus, DEL–sequents are more expressive than dynamic inferences, and also more
abstract because they ‘operate’ at a deeper level, a semantical one. It is this more
general and abstract approach towards dynamic styles of inference that will allow us to
relate more precisely and closely DEL with substructural logics, and explain to a certain
extent why the substructural phenomena occurring in dynamic inferences and observed
by van Benthem arise.
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5.4.2 DEL–sequents for Progression, Regression and Epistemic Planning
Recently again, van Benthem (2010) expressed some worries about interpreting the Lam-
bek Calculus (the paradigmatic substructural logic) as a base logic of information flow
while trying to connect the operators ◦,⊃ and ⊂ of substructural logic to some sort of
DEL operators. Indeed, the DEL operators usually rely on the regular algebra of sequen-
tial composition, choice and iteration which are of a quite different nature. Recently,
I introduced some DEL operators called progression, regression and epistemic planning
(Aucher, 2011, 2012), the operator of regression being a natural generalization of the
standard and original action modality [E , e]ϕ of DEL (Batlag et al., 1998). It turns out
that these operators can all be identified with connectives of the substructural language
LR. After some informal motivations, we first briefly recall their definitions and then
we give our correspondence results between the two kinds of operators.
As spelled out in Section 2, the core idea of DEL is to split the task of representing
the agents’ beliefs into three parts. Consequently, within the logical framework of DEL,
one can express uniformly epistemic statements about:
(i) what is true about an initial situation,
(ii) what is true about an event occurring in this situation,
(iii) what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred.
From a logical point of view, this trichotomy begs the following three questions
(which were already raised by Kooi (2007)). In these questions, ϕ, α and ϕf are three
epistemic formulas describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii).
• Question 1:
1. Given (i) and (ii), what can we infer about (iii): ϕ, α ϕf?
2. How can we build a single formula ϕ⊗α which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (iii) from ϕ and α?
• Question 2:
1. Given (i) and (iii), what can we infer about (ii): ϕ,ϕf α?
2. How can we build a single formula ϕ P ϕf which captures all the infor-
mation which can be inferred about (ii) from ϕ and ϕf?
• Question 3:
1. Given (ii) and (iii), what can we infer about (i): α,ϕf ϕ?
2. How can we build a single formula ϕϕf which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (i) from α and ϕf?
Providing formal tools that answer these questions leads to applications in artificial
intelligence and theoretical computer science, and as it turns out, some of them have
already been addressed in DEL and other logical formalisms.
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• Question 1: Progression. Answering the first question leads to the development
of tools that can be used by (artificial) agents to compute autonomously their
representation of situations as events occur or to reason about the effects of these
events. This question has been addressed in the situation calculus, where it is
related to the notion of progression (Reiter, 2001). In the logics of programs,
our DEL-sequent ϕ, α ϕf correspond to the partial correctness specifications
{ϕ}pi{ϕf} of Hoare’s logic (1969) which read as “after every successful execution
of program pi starting from a state where precondition ϕ holds, postcondition
ϕf holds in the final state”. Likewise, our formula ϕ ⊗ α corresponds to the
strongest post-condition of Propositional Dynamic Logic Pratt (1976). That the
product update of DEL is in fact the same as the strongest post-condition has
been elaborated on and proved in an algebraic setting in Baltag et al. (2005). A
sequent calculus is also provided in this algebraic setting.
• Question 2: Epistemic planning. Answering the second question also leads to
applications in artificial intelligence in the area of epistemic planning : (artificial)
agents often need to determine autonomously which actions they need to perform
in order to achieve a given epistemic goal. This second question is also related
to the notion of explanation and has been dealt with in the event calculus of
Shanahan (1997) for instance, where it is shown that planning problems can be
handled via abduction (using logic programming). In computer science, this second
question is also related to the synthesis problem raised by Church (1957) in its full
generality. He asked whether, given a desired relation between a set of inputs and
a set of outputs, we can construct a function that produces the desired outputs
from arbitrary inputs. This problem has been declined as the problem of program
synthesis: given a specification, can we construct a program that is guaranteed to
satisfy this specification? It was extensively studied in the 1980s and 1990s for
temporal logic specifications. The synthesis problem is more challenging when the
input is incomplete (Kupferman and Vardi, 1999). Open (reactive) environments
can be a reason of incompleteness of the input, and epistemic logic is a natural
formalism to resort to model such situations, as argued by Halpern and Moses
(1990). For single-agent temporal epistemic logic, this synthesis problem has been
solved by van der Meyden and Vardi (1998). However, this problem has not been
addressed so far within the DEL approach, although its methodology and formal
setting lend itself rather naturally to address it.
• Question 3: Regression. Answering the third question is related to the notion
of regression introduced in the situation calculus (Reiter, 2001). This technique
is used to determine whether a statement holds after a sequence of events (called
the projection problem) by reducing (regressing) this statement about the resulting
situation to a statement about the initial situation. In DEL, regression corresponds
to the classical reduction method used to prove completeness of an axiomatization:
a formula with dynamic operator(s) is ‘reduced’ equivalently to a formula without
dynamic operator by pushing the dynamic operator through the logical connectives,
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performing some kind of regression of the initial formula with dynamic operator.
In (Aucher, 2012), our inductive definition of the regression of ϕf by α, i.e. α 
ϕf , is based on the reduction axioms of DEL (Baltag and Moss, 2004). Note
that in Propositional Dynamic Logic, ¬(ϕ¬ϕf ) also corresponds to the weakest
precondition.
Now, we provide the formal definitions of these operators of progression, regression
and epistemic planning.
Progression The operator of progression is denoted ⊗ in (Aucher, 2011). In (Aucher,
2012, Def. 41), a constructive definition of this operator is provided using characteris-
tic formulas (called “Kit Fine” formulas). Here, we provide an alternative and non–
constructive definition of the progression of ϕ by α, denoted ϕ⊗ α:
Theorem 17. Let (Mf , wf ) be a pointed L–model and let ϕ ∈ L and α ∈ Lα. Then,
Mf , wf ϕ⊗ α iff there is a pointed L–model (M, w) and a pointed
Lα–model (E , e) such that (M, w)⊗ (E , e) - (Mf , wf ),
M, w ϕ and E , e α
Proof. It follows from Lemmata 43 and 44 of (Aucher, 2011).
Epistemic Planning The operator of epistemic planning is denoted P in (Aucher,
2012). It is defined relatively to a finite set P of formulas/preconditions/atomic events.
In (Aucher, 2012, Def. 14–15), a constructive definition of this operator is provided using
characteristic formulas (called “Kit Fine” formulas). As it turns out, an alternative and
non–constructive definition of the epistemic planning from ϕ to ϕf , denoted ϕ P ϕf ,
exists as well:
Theorem 18 (Aucher 2012). Let ϕ,ϕf ∈ L and let P be a finite subset of L. Then, for
all P–complete Lα–model (E , e), it holds that
E , e ϕP ϕf iff there is (M, w) such that M, w ϕ,M, w Iα(e) and (M, w)⊗ (E , e) ϕf
The dual of the operator ϕP ϕf is defined by:
ϕ[]Pϕf := ¬(ϕP ¬ϕf ) (24)
Theorem 18 entails that ϕ[]Pϕf can be alternatively defined as follows: for all
P–complete Lα–model (E , e), it holds that
E , e ϕ[]Pϕf iff for all (M, w) such that M, w ϕ, if
M, w Iα(e) then (M, w)⊗ (E , e) ϕf
(25)
Example 4. In the situation depicted in the L-model of Figure 1, agent B does not
know that agent A has the red card and does not know that agent C has the blue card:
M, w (♦BrA ∧ ♦B¬rA) ∧ (♦BbC ∧ ♦B¬bC). Our problem is therefore the following:
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What sufficient and necessary property (i.e. ‘minimal’ property) an event should
fulfill so that its occurence in the initial situation (M, w) results in a situation
where agent B knows the true state of the world, i.e. agent B knows that agent A
has the red card and that agent C has the blue card?
The answer to this question obviously depends on the kind of atomic events we consider.
In this example, the events P = {pbC , prA , pwB} under consideration are the following.
First, agent C shows her blue card (pbC ), second, agent A shows her red card (prA), and
third, agent B herself shows her white card (pwB ). Answering this question amounts to
compute the formula (M,w)P B (rA ∧ bC ∧ wB). Applying the algorithm of (Aucher,
2012, Definition 15), we obtain that
(M, w)P B (rA ∧ bC ∧ wB)↔ B(pbC ∨ prA) is valid.
In other words, this result states that agent B should believe either that agent A
shows her red card or that agent C shows her blue card in order to know the true state
of the world. Indeed, since there are only three different cards which are known by the
agents and agent B already knows her card, if she learns the card of (at least) one of the
other agents, she will also be able to infer the card of the third agent. 
Regression The operator of regression is denoted  in (Aucher, 2011). In (Aucher,
2012, Def. 41), a constructive definition of this operator is provided using characteristic
formulas (called “Kit Fine” formulas) by adapting and translating the reduction axioms
of (Batlag et al., 1998). As it turns out, an alternative and non–constructive definition
of the regression of ϕf by α, denoted α ϕf , exists as well:
Theorem 19 (Aucher 2012). Let α ∈ Lα and ϕf ∈ L. Then, for all L-model (M, w),
it holds that
M, w α ϕf iff there is (E , e) such that E , e α,M, w Iα(e) and (M, w)⊗ (E , e) ϕf
Note that we could define a dual operator of α ϕf as follows:
α[]ϕf = ¬ (α ¬ϕf ) (26)
Then, the counterpart of Theorem 19 for this dual operator is as follows:
M, w α[]ϕf iff for all (E , e) such that E , e α,if M, w Iα(e) then (M, w)⊗ (E , e) ϕf (27)
As shown in (Aucher, 2012, Sec. 6), the operator α[]ϕf is a generalization of the
original and more standard DEL operator [E , e]ϕ almost exclusively used in the DEL
literature (Batlag et al., 1998).
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Substructural operators DEL operators
◦ ⊗
⊃ []
⊂ []
Figure 9: Correspondence between DEL and Substructural Operators
Correspondence between DEL and Substructural Operators As one can easily
notice, there is a strong similarity between the operations of progression, epistemic
planning and regression and the operations of substructural logic, more precisely of
the Lambek Calculus. In fact, there exists a rigorous mapping between them, as the
following theorem shows:
Theorem 20. Let M⊗ be the DEL product update model where the point set is P :=
(C ∪ Cα,-). Let P be a finite subset of L, let x = (M, w) ∈ C and let y = (E , e) ∈ CαP be
a P -complete pointed event model. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ L and let α ∈ Lα. Then,
M⊗, x ϕ ◦ α iff M, w ϕ⊗ α
M⊗, x α ⊃ ϕ iff M, w α[]ϕ
M⊗, y ψ ⊂ ϕ iff E , e ϕ[]Pψ
Moreover, for all α, α1, . . . , αn ∈ Lα, for all ϕ,ψ, ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ L, we have:
ϕ;α ψ iff ϕ, α ψ
(((ϕ0;α1), ϕ1); . . . ;αn), ϕn ψ iff ϕ0, α1, ϕ1, . . . , αn, ϕn ψ
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Theorems 17, 18, 19 and the truth conditions
of the operators ◦,⊃, ⊂ and ;.
Theorem 20 explains to a certain extent why some substructural phenomena arise in
the dynamic inferences of Section 5.4.1. As observed by van Benthem, “it seemed that
structural rules address mere symptoms of some underlying phenomenon” (van Benthem,
2011a, p. 297). I claim that these “symptoms” are caused at a deeper semantic level by
the fact that an update, and in that case the DEL product update, can be represented
by the ternary relation of substructural logics.
The key Theorem 42 of (Aucher, 2011) relates DEL–sequents and the operator of
progression: for all ϕ,ϕf ∈ L and α ∈ Lα, it holds that
ϕ, α ϕf iff ϕ⊗ α ϕf . (28)
As it turns out, this theorem is also valid in any substructural logic: it corresponds
to the theorem of Expression (2). More generally, all the theorems of the non-associative
Lambek calculus hold in our DEL setting if we use the translation given in Figure 9. In
particular, we have the following results which are the counterparts of Expressions (3),
(4) and (5) in our setting:
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Corollary 1. Let P be a finite subset of L. For all ϕ,ϕf ∈ L and α ∈ Lα, it holds that
ϕ;α ϕf iff ϕ α[]ϕf (29)
ϕ α[]ϕf iff ϕ⊗ α ϕf (30)
ϕ⊗ α ϕf iff α CαP ϕ[]Pϕf (31)
ϕ α[]ϕf iff α CαP ϕ[]Pϕf (32)
6 Conclusion
We introduced a logic called update logic where updates are the central objects of study.
We elicited a number of axioms and inference rules that define specific properties of
updates. Even if this paves the way for a correspondence theory analyzing and studying
the notion of update, it remains to characterize other important properties of updates
in terms of axioms and inference rules, such as for instance determinism or bisimulation
invariance. In fact , we view our contributions as a first step in our exploration of the
update universe. Indeed, we focused our attention in this report on the DEL product
update. It is, however, a particular kind of update operator and the ternary relation of
substructural logics could actually be a representation of any sort of update. In that
respect, in the DEL paradigm, Liu (2008) mentions some of the alternatives to the DEL
product update and van Eijck et al. (2011) recently introduced a new sort of product
update (subsequently studied by Aceto et al. (2013)). But more generally, the ternary
relation could also represent the various revision and update operators which have been
studied in the logics of “common sense reasoning” of artificial intelligence and philosoph-
ical logic, such as conditional logic (Nute and Cross, 2001), default and non-monotonic
logics (Makinson, 2005; Gabbay et al., 1998), belief revision theory (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988),
etc. . . In fact, in the DEL framework, numerous product update rules for belief revi-
sion have been proposed in a setting with more refined representations of uncertainty
(by means of plausibility or probability measures for instance): (Aucher, 2004; van Dit-
marsch, 2005; Aucher, 2007; Baltag and Smets, 2006, 2008a; van Benthem, 2007a; Liu,
2008; van Benthem et al., 2009b). Nevertheless, one still needs to show that the proof
techniques developed in this report can be adapted to these more refined representations
of uncertainty.
Moreover, we proposed Gentzen calculi for our update logic and for DEL, using our
correspondence results. To prove the completeness of these calculi, we introduced new
proof techniques based on a Henkin construction. These techniques are not specific to
our update logic or DEL and we applied them to modal logic (and propositional logic).
To conclude, we have also shown that DEL can be embedded within the frame-
work of substructural logic in an intuitively meaningful way, in the sense that in this
embedding the intuitions underlying the DEL framework provide a reasonable and mean-
ingful interpretation of the ternary semantics of substructural logic. In addition to other
non-classical logics such as the Lambek calculus, linear logic, relevance logic, arrow
logic,. . . this new embedding illustrates the richness and expressiveness of the general
framework of substructural logics: it is defined in such a way that it can even capture in
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a meaningful way logics which are sometimes considered as isolated or ‘exotic’, like DEL.
Therefore, our results are new evidences in support to the fact that the framework of
substructural logics can indeed be considered as an unifying framework for non-classical
logics.
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